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IN 'THE. SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Est~ate of 
WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased 
THEO· SvV AN HENDEE, 
Plaintiff and R.espon,dent, 
-vs.-
\V ALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
Executor of the Last Will and Testament 
df WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased; 
GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL 
!(OS TO PULOS; and ADA BRIDGE, 
Defendants amd Appellants. 
BRIEF' ·OF APPELLANTS. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT· 
Case No. 8216 
The plaintiff and respondent will be referred to as 
contes1tant or in her own name, and defendants and appel-
lants vvill be referred to collectively ias prop.onents or in-
dividually in their own names. 
All italics are ours. 
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The following appendices appear at the back of this 
Brief for the convenience of the court: 
APPENDIX NO. 1 
Last Will and Testament of Wilda Gail Swan. 
APPENDIX NO. 2 
Codicil to Last Will and Te'Stamentt of Wilda Gail 
Swan. 
APPENDIX NO. 3 
Second codicil to Last Will and Testament of Wilda 
Gail Swan. 
APPENDIX NO. 4 
An exact duplicate otf defendants' Exhibit 18, which 
is a graphic ·p,ort.rayal of the prop·erties and devises in-
volved in thi'S will contest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wilda Gail ·swan p~assed away on the 28th day of 
M.ay, 19·52' leaving a will signed on l\f~ay 2, 1947, ·a codicil 
signed on February 20, 1950, and a codicil signed on 
A·p·ril 23, 1951. 
On fhe 5th day of J nne, 1952 the Walker Bank & 
Trust Comp·any filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
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in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, a Petition for Probate 
of Will and Codicils, and for issuance of Letters Testa-
Inentary. 
·On J nne 25, 1952 Patricia. P. Stewart testified as 
subscribing witness to the will and first codicil, and 
Adolph ~1. Neilsen, M.D., testified as ·subscribing witness 
to the second codicil. On the same date Judge Martin ~1:. 
Larson signed an Order Admitting Will to Probate, and 
Letters Testamentary were issued to the Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as Executors of the Estate of Wilda 
Gail Swan, decea'Sed. 
Thereafter, on the 8th day of November, 1952, Theo 
Swan Hendee filed this action alleging generally tha.t at 
the times of signing the will a.nd codicils Wilda Gail Swan 
lacked testa1nentary capacity and was acting under the 
undue influence of Grant Macfarlane, her lawyer and a 
beneficiary in her will and codicils, and of Daniel Ko-
stopulos, a friend and a beneficiary in the codicils, and 
praying that the will and codicils be deel,ared null and 
void and that the entire estate be drstributed to Theo 
S\van Hendee, as the only heir of the deceased. There-
after, the defendanlts answered, in effect denying the alle-
gations of the co1nplaint and contest, and praying that the 
estate be distributed according to the terms of 1the will 
and codicils. The case wa.s tried by the Honorable Parley 
E. N orseth, 'Sitting without a jury. Thereafter, on the 
1-1-th day of 1\fay, 1954, 'the court made its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and entered judgn1ent in favor 
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of the plaintiff denying probate of the will and codicils. 
On the 24th day of May, 1954 delfendants., Grant Mac-
farlane and Daniel Kostopulos filed objections to the 
court's Findings. of Faclt and Conclusions of Law and 
also a 1fotion for a new trial. On the 15th day of July, 
1954 the trial court entered its Order denying said Mo-
tion for a new trial. On the 3rd day of August, 1954 said 
defendants filed their Notice of App·eal. 
Inasmuch as the ultimate decision on appeal will de-
pend to a large extent on whether the findings of the 
trial court are justified by the evidence, we deem it neces-
sary to make a rather comp~rehensive state1nent of facts. 
A Brief History 
VVilda Gail S\van was born at Salt Lake City; Utah 
in 1890 (R. 94). Her sister and only heir-at-law, Theo 
Swan Hendee, was born in 1888 (R. 94). Gail's father '''"as 
Ed Swan (R. 93). Her mother was Blanche Swan (R. 93). 
Gail started life as a normal, healthy child. She be-
gan school in the year 1896 and continued until1902 when 
she suffered a violent epileptic seizure (R. 95). Fron1 
1902 until 1917 Gail suffered fro1n epileptic seizures of 
varying degrees of intensity. In 1917 a Dr. McGee, at 
Laramie, Wyoming, administered treatments which very 
n1uch imp·roved her condition (R .. 100). During these 
years Gail did not attend school, although she did receive 
private tutoring from a M'rs. Sneddon (R. 140). Gail was 
never Inarried, and due largely to her physical frailties, 
lived a secluded life (R. 101, 108, 131). 
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She and lher parents moved to the family residence at 
1335 Perry Avenue in 1922 (R·. 104). From 19·22 to 1931 
Gail's n1other \Vas an invalid and required eonstant nurs-
ing care. Her In other died in 1931 ( R~. 107). During the 
~,.ears that followed Gail's general condition "improved 
a great deal" (R. 112). 
Gail's father died after an extended illness at the 
}liners Ifospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 30th day 
of June, 1950 ( R. 119). She continued to live at the 
fa1nily residence until her o\vn death on the 28th day of 
.Jiay, 1952. Between her father's death and Gail's death, 
three different housekeepers stayed with her, the first 
being l\frs. Sheeran, the second Grace Folden, and the last 
~\lice vV ags taff ( R. 119) . 
During the last six years of her life, Gail was hos-
pitalized five tirnes, the last being approximately six 
\veeks at the L.D.S. Hospital. She \Vas treated on this 
occasion by Dr. F'rank. 
Gail's only living relatives at the ti1ne of her death 
\Vere her sister, Theo; her aunt, Bell I\fartsolf; a cousin, 
Dee Stone, who practiced law in New York City, and .a 
cousin, ~1rs. Bowell, who lived at Harrisburg, I~ennsyl­
vania ( R. 129). 
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Gail and Theo 
Theo live-d at the Srwan home until she graduated 
from high school. In 1907, 1908 an·d 1909 she attended 
the University of C.alifornia. In 1909, 1910 and 1911 she 
attended Vassar, an exclusive ._ school for women. 
S'he graduated from Vas'sa:r with an A.B. degree in 1911 
(R. 98). Thereafter she attended the University of Utah 
where she received a B.S. degree (R .. 141). 
In 1911, 1912 and 1913 she taught school a.t Mountain 
Home, Idaho. In 1913 and 1914 she was in Europe on an 
extended va:ca:tion tour with a Mrs. Bogue and her 
daughter (R. 98, 99). 
Theo married Harold (Deak) Hendee in 1914 and 
lived with him in the Eastern States until1922, when she 
and her husband moved to San FTancisco, California 
where Mr. Hendee worked for the Oakland Tribune, the 
C:oa:.st Banner and thereafter became editor of the Wall 
Street Journal (R. 104). During the years that followed, 
Theo visited at the 'Swan household an average of two or 
.. ;l .... 
three 1times a year (R. 110-112). She also corresponded 
re~.~~ly with Gail and frequently called Gail by tele-
phone (R. ·112). 
Theo and her husband led a socially active life at 
San Francisco (R. 142, 143). Mr. Hendee belonged to th·e 
Bohen1ia.n Club, Chamber of Co1nmerce and Rotary Club. 
Theo belonged to such exclusive clubs as the San Fran-
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cisco Musical Club, Pacific 11:usical Club, the Harp 
Club, the Forest Hill Garden Club, the Pi Phi Sorority 
and the Vassar Club (R. 142, 143). 
Theo herself testified th-at a.s a result of the extreme 
difference in their social positions Gail had an inferiority 
complex in her relationship with Theo (R. 141). 
Following the year 1935 Gail only visited at Theo's 
home on two occ~sions. She didn't feel at home at Theo's 
(R. 145). Aunt Bell Martsolf testified to Gail's ·R\vare-
ness orf lthe difference in the social life between Gail and 
Theo (R .. 293). 
Gail had certain difficulties with Theo from time to 
time, and on 1nore than one occasion had responded to 
Theo's questionings with the answer, ''None of your 
business'' (R. 131, 132, 167). 
Another indication of difficulties betrween the two is 
demonstrated by The'O's testimony on cross-examination 
(R.- 169) : 
"Q. You wrote Macfarlane didn't you, a let-
ter, or Ga,yle Macfarlane, on the 27th of N ovem-
ber, 1951, in which you said to Gayle, 'Caution 
Grant to remember I did not see any of you while 
we were in Salt Lake this time. If Gail found 
out I had called at the office, trouble might brew 
again. A little care is so important.'~ Did you 
write her that~ 
"A. I think I did." 
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11rs. w~agsta!ff testified that Gail thought rr,heo \Yas 
ashamed of her, and alsn thaJt Gail resented Theo sending 
cast off clothing to her ( R. 695, 696, 699, 700). 
Macfarlane testified to an occasion when Gail told 
him he would get his "walking papers" if he discussed her 
affairs with Theo again (R. 726). 
Clair Mortensen, Trust Officer and \ 7ice President 
of w.alker Bank & TTust Company, testified that during 
the 18 years he ·had known Gail she had talked to hiin 
about Theo ·on at least 15 or 20 occasions up to her last 
illness and that on these occasions Gail had 'Said Theo 
was .amply ·provided for ·and she didn't intend to "leave 
her very much.'' (R. 486, 487). 
After the Walker Bank took over Inanagement of 
Gail's property M·ortensen became acquainted with Theo 
and Theo came t·o see him on a number of occasions. Gail 
found out about this. In this connection l\Iortensen testi-
fied (R. 478): 
"Q. Did Gail say anything about it to you, 
about her coining up to see you about her, Gail'~ 
business~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What did she say~ 
"A. She said: 'Don't tell n1y sisteT anything 
about my business.' 
"Q. Do you recall anything further being 
said by her along that line~ 
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'~A. Well, just that she made it very cle,ar to 
n1e, and \Vas very definite: 'I don't want my sister 
to see any of the records pertaining to my busi-
ness. I don't want her to know anything about my 
business.' 
"Q. And did that type of conversation take 
place more than once after you took over the p-rop-
erty management.~ 
"A. On three or four occasions." 
Theo asked Gail about her will two months before 
her death and Gail told her nothing about its content (R. 
128). 
l\frs. Blanche Carney, Gail's h;airdresser, recalled 
conversations in which Gail had told her that Theo hadn't 
been too kind to her ( R. 818, 819). However, Macfarlane 
testified that the relationship between Gail and Theo im-
proved not long before Gail's death (R. 229). 
Gail acquired -one of the properties involved in this 
litigation by deed from her grandfather in the year 1911. 
She acquired the other properties in later life by deed 
from her father (Ex. D-18). 
Theo had acquired property by deed from her 
grandfather valued at $55,000. She had also received a 
valuable piece of property fro1n her mother, as well as a 
piece of property helo\v the l\Ioxu1n Hotel fro1n her father 
( n. 163, 165, 166). 
Gail kne\v about the properties and revenues Theo 
\Yas re·ceiving (R. 166). 
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Gail and Daniel Kostopulos 
Dan Kostop·ulos immigrated to the United States 
from Greece· in his early youth. He had been in the 
theater business .at Salt Lake City, Utah since 19'24 (R. 
317). 
He met Grant Swan in 1932 at a theater Christmas 
p~arty (R. 318). 
He met Gail about six months later when Gail's 
father brought her to the theater. Thereafter, Gail and 
her father custo1narily dropp·ed in at the theater to say 
hello to Kostopulos when they were downtown (R. 318). 
The first tin1e Kostopulos visited at the Swan horne 
was in March of 1940 on the occasion ·Of Mr. Swan's birth-
day. Thereafter Kostopulos hec:ame a frequent visitor. 
Mr. Swan called hin1 "My big boy" (R .. 319, 320). When 
Mr. S·w·an became ill in 19,50 and had to he· hospitalized 
l(ostop·ulos was at the Swan household practically eve.ry 
day (R. 320). Kostopulos :arranged for Mr. Swan's hos-
pitalization during his l·ast illness, and even rented a 
rnore comfort1able bed for him. 
F·ollowing Mr. Swan's death Gail depended more and 
rnore on l-(ostop·ulos for her daily needs (R. 341, 407). 
Grac.e Folden testified that Gail frequently would 
telephone Dan, and either Dan or hi's wife would come 
and t~ake her to town and bring her home (R. 341, 342, 412, 
442). 
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Aunt Bell 1fartsolf testified (R. 269, 307): 
''Gale depended on him for transportation 
into town; he was very attentive to take her * * * 
* * * 
"She called him a great many times on the 
,phone for things she wanted, and he was very 
attentive and brought up whatever she wanted, 
maybe only a loaf of bread but he would come." 
Dr. Frank affirmed the fact that Gail had much af-
fection for Dan (R. 534). 
Mrs. Carney, Gail's hairdres'Ser, testified ( R .. 817) : 
"A * * * She spoke of Dan Kostopulos. Said 
that he had been her very best friend.'' 
Theo first met l(ostopulos in 1946 at his theater. 
Thereafter s'he becrune well acquainted with Dan. She 
stated, "He came a great deal to the fan1ily home. He 
1net me at the airport. He was very kind to me" ( R. 127). 
Theo corrsidered Kostopulos to be her friend (R. 329). 
Kostopulos called Theo for advice from time to time 
when things went wrong at the Swan household (R. 337, 
338). 
Gail and Grant Macfarlane 
Grant 1facfarlane had practiced law at Salt I~ake 
City, Utah since 1927 (R. 186). 
He first became acquainted with Gail in September 
of 1944 (R. 187). 
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Jack Forsberg, an e1nployee and friend of the Swan 
family, had referred Gail to ~Iacfarlane in connection 
\vith a controversy she was having \vith the O.P.A. Mac-
farlane handled this matter for her (R. 187). In the Fall 
of 1944 l\facfarlane saw Gail on four or five occasions. 
In N ovemher of that year 'S'he brought some· abstracts to 
his office and a.ske·d hin1 to be her regular attorney. She 
explained that Judge George Armstrong had been her 
attorney until his death; that thereafter \Tern on 'Snyder 
had been her attorney (R. 188, 189). In 1945 Gail caine 
to ~1:a.cfarlane's office probably a dozen times, sometimes 
on business n1atters and someti1nes for a friendly vi~it 
(R. 189, 190). 
In the latter part of 1946 l\1acfarlane suffered an 
injury to his left eye consisting of a detached retina. 
An operation was successful but a later infection caused 
loss of the center vision of the eye. He \vas hospital-
ized or convalescing from October 2, 1946 to January 1, 
1947 (R·. 192). Gail executed her \vill just three months 
later. In connection with Gail's reaction to ).[acfarlane's 
1nrsfortune, he testified (R. 713, 714) : 
"A. Well, she indicated that-she said that 
I had five children to educate, th'at I had lost the 
sight of one e·ye, and if I ever sustained another 
injury that I might he blind, and that it would be 
difficult for me to practic.e." 
During 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950 Gail continued to 
come to 1\Iacfarl'ane's office for profes'Sional advice and 
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for social visits, and during this ti1ne l\1a.efarlane and his 
\Vife and children paid visits to the S.vvan home (R. 195, 
196). 
~facfarlane received a detached retina injury to his 
right eye in N ove1nber of 1950, and in January of 19·51 
he \vent to San Francisco for an operation (R. 199, 733). 
He \vas confined to the hospital approximately four 
vveeks. Thereafter he stayed in San Francisco tvvo weeks 
and 'spent an additional two weeks in Nevada. He re-
turned to Salt Lake City on March 1, 1951 and first sa\v 
Gail in the latter part of 1\iarch, 1951. At that time she 
told hi1n sl1e \vas sorry he had had so rnuch difficulty and 
that she \vould like to be helpful to him and his family 
in any way that she could. Less than a month later 
she executed the 1second codicil to her will (R. 733). 
Grace Folden, witness for the plaintiff, testified re-
garding Gail's attitude toward Grant l\1:acfarlane as fol-
lows (R. 405) : 
''A. Yes. She thought a great deal of hirn. 
She thought whatever he done was perfect." 
She also testified that when ~[acfarlane had his sec-
ond eye operation Gail worried until she had a 1Severe 
epileptic seizure ( R. 432). 
Dr. Frank's card (Ex. 19) has a notation dated J anu-
ary 3, 1951, that the night b~fore Gail had had an e,pilep-
tic attack, that she "has been worrying about lawyer 
friend's eyes." 
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Mrs. Carney corroborated other testimony that Gail 
had much affection for Macfarlane and was very worried 
about his eye condition (R. 818). 
Morten'Sen had six or eight. conversations. with Gail 
pertaining to her will, in which Gail told him th.at she was 
concerned about Macfarlane's condition, and wanted to 
do s'omething for him and his family (R .. 489, 490). 
Macfariane met Grant Swan in 1945 at Gail's request. 
Thereafter his relationship with Mr. Swan was very 
friendly and congenial. They discus1sed Mr. Swan's early 
years and various ranching activities in Wyoming. T·hey 
likewise discussed the comparisons between the names 
of the two familie~s, Grant ·swan, Grant Macfarlane, Gail 
Swan and Gayle Macfarlane (R. 711). 
When l\1r. S-wan and Mr. Beam had a misunderstand-
ing, Macfarlane helped 1nake peace· (R. 712). l\Iacfarlane 
advised and assisted l\1r. Swan in connection with an 
assault and battery charge when a gardner struck 1Ir. 
Swan with a garden rake (R. 713). He also handled 
several busine1SS matters for Mr. S-wan, including pre-
p~aration of Mr. Svvan's 'viii on the 31st of Dece1nber, 
1946 (R. 200). 
Macfarlane was very attentive to 1\Ir. Svvan during 
his last illness 'at the Mine·rs Hospital ( R. 711). 
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~facfa.rlane n1et Theo son1eti1ne in the year 1948 (R. 
193). Thereafter Theo vi,sited his office from time to 
ti1ne on her trips to Salt Lake and on occasions discussed 
problems at the Swan home with him. 
Theo SR\V Macfarlane once or twice in 1949; two or 
three times in 1950 and twice in 1952 on occasions wh.en 
Gail was hospitwlized. In addition to these occasions she 
sa\V him from time to time at the family home (~. 125). 
Theo testified that Gail called her by telephone when 
:Thiacfarlane was at San FTancisco for his eye operation; 
that Gail was very distressed. ThereHfter, Theo s·aw Mr. 
and ~:frs. Macfarlane and a'ssisted them in every way 
possible during their stay at San Francisco (R. 124). 
She looked upon Macfarlane as a friend and relied 
upon hi1n to keep her advised as to conditions a.t the S·wan 
household (R. 196-199). 
Gail and the Bridges 
In 19-!4 J'oseph La1nar Bridge \vas in the ar1ny, and 
Ada, his wife, was he'lping with family finance(s by selling 
eggs and butter. She first became acquainted with Gail 
as a customer. A'S time passed, she and Gail became very 
well acquainted (R. 604). After Mr. Bridge returned 
from the service in December of 1945 he also became ac-
quainted with Gail (R. 605). The Bridges enjoyed their 
growing friendship· with Gail. They spent many evenings 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
at the Swan ho1ne playing Canasta with her and 1Ir. 
Beam (R. 605). This practice c.ontinued lmtil the time of 
Gail's death (R .. 605). 
The Bridges had six c.hildren. They allowed Gail to 
name the two youngest Mary Bianch·e and Edward Grant 
after her mother and grandfather (R. 607, 627). She 
attended the christening and even bought the christening 
dress for the youngest one (R. 772). 
·Gail frequently spent a day at the Bridge ho~ne. The 
Bridges treated her like a member of their family (R. 
624). They even had one room in their ho1ne which they 
called "GaiPs room'' (R. 433, 434). 
Ada often accon1panied Gail on shopping trips. They 
would usually go to Auerbach's and the Floraine Fnsh-
ions at Sugarhouse (R. 608). Ada helped Gail se:lect the 
range, refrigerator and other equip·ment for her kitchen 
(R. 612). She also helped select materials for Gail's 
drape1s in the living room (R. 622). 
On occasions Gail gave Ada gifts. She gave Ada a 
ring for her birthday 'vhic.h had been given to Gail by her 
1nother. She gave her hose for Christmas and her birth-
day (R. 620, 621). 
On one occasion Gail learned that the Bridges 'vere 
abandoning a planned vacation trip· because they couldn't 
afford a needed set of tires. She insi'sted on giving then1 
$100.00 to purchase the tires rather than see the fami'ly 
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disappointed (R. 631, 632). On another occasion the 
Bridges were endeavoring to build a home. They had 
completed a basement apartment but the roof \vas leak-
ing and they couldn't afford to place a roof on the home 
at that time. Gail insisted on loaning them the money 
for ·this purpose. The loan was in the amount of $3,000. 
Thereafter ~fr. Bridge performed certain work for Gail 
on her various properties and she would give him credit 
on the loan. On sorne occasions she gave him credits on 
the loan which \vere in the nature of gift~s (R. 644, 645). 
Aunt Belll\!IartS'oilf testified the relationship between 
Gail ·and the Bridges was "very intimate" ( R. 277), and 
that ~Ir. S\van also was very fond of the Bridges (R. 314, 
317). ~1rs. Folden testified that the relationship between 
Gail and ~Ir. and ~f rs. Bridgelf was ''very affectionate" 
(R·. 412). 
Gail and Oscar Burnside Beam 
Oscar Burnside Bearn testified that he was 83 years 
of age; that he was a cook by profession during his active 
years; that he had 1noved to Salt Lake City in 1938. 
He rnet Gail in 194:2 vvhen he was papering-a roorn for 
one of Gail's tenants. Thereafter Gail introduced him to 
her father (R. 588). Eventually l~eam became a frequent 
visitor at the s,van household. He took ·care of the la \Vn 
and perforrned other chores for the Swans (R·. 588, 589). 
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In about 1947 it became his custom to be at the Swan 
home every day, and to ~stay for the evening mea:l (R. 
589, 590), and thereafter to play C'hinese checkers or 
Canasta with Gail and various of her friends. He becan1e 
very well acquainted wit.h Theo during these years and 
also became acquainted with Kosto:pulos, ~1acfarl'ane, the 
Bridges and the Franks (R,. 592-594, 598, 599). 
He characterized his. relationship with Gail as, "vVe 
are good friends" and his relationship with Theo as, "We 
were very good friends" (R. 594, 595). 
Macfarlane testified that he had talked with Gail 
about Mr. Beam on p~robab[y two or more occasions, and 
that on these occasions Gail had told him that Be:am had 
been a faithful person and would always have a home in 
the Swan household. He also discussed Mr. Beam's age 
with Gail (R. 733, 734). At the time of trial Beam lived 
at the Swan home at 1335 Perry A venue, vvhere Theo 
"\Vas also living (R. 588). 
Grant Macfarlane, Dan Kostopulos and the Bridges 
Macfarlane became acquainted with Kostopulos when 
Mr. Swan was taken to the Holy Cross Hospital during 
his last illness in June of 1950 (R. 7·57). The next time 
Macfarlane saw Kostopulos "\Vas shortly after 1\{acfar-
lane's second eye operation when Kostopulos took Gail to 
Macfarlane's home and the two of then1 took him for a 
short walk (R. 757). Thereafter Macfarlane saw Kostop-
ulos only a few times (R .. 758). 
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~facfarlane met the Bridges at the S.wan ho1ne when 
they vvere playing C·a.nasta one evening with Gail. He 
had only seen thern on two or three occasions pri·or to 
Gail's death (R. 758). 
Kostopulos ap~parently had no association with the 
Bridge~s, although he was acquainted with then1. Theo 
testified that Kostopulos actually was opposed to the 
close friendship between Gail and the Bridges (R. 183, 
184). 
Gail's Appearance, Her Hobbies, and H·er Social Activities 
Mrs. Carney testified that Gail was modest, neat 
and clean in appearance and that she dres'sed very well 
(R. 819, 820). 
Mrs. Bridge thought tltat Gail had very good taste 
1n clothing. She selected her own -clothing ( R. 629). 
Mortensen thought Gail appeared a little quaint and 
old-fashioned although she was always neat and clean. 
With respect to her perS"onality he testified that she was 
pleasant ( R .. 4 71). 
Gail played the piano "well" (R .. 631). Her mother 
had also taught her to play the guitar and several pieces 
on the harp (R. 102, 103). s·he had ·a "nice sense of music 
and a good ear" (R. 103). 
Gail took considerable interest 1n a collection of 
curios (R. 103). 
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She wa~s. interested in ·civic affairs. She read the 
newspaper every morning. When she would co1ne across 
an article of particular interest she would make so1ne 
appropriate con1ment (R·. 621, 691, 69'2, 693). 
She frequently commented on civic affairs to Mrs. 
Carney when she was having her hair dressed (R. 817), 
and also t.o Mr: Morten'sen when she w·ould see him at 
the hank (R. 472-474). 
Records of the County Clerk's office reveal th·a.t Gail 
voted in the municipal elections of 1945 and 19·47, and 
in the general election of 1948 (R. 754). 
Gail had a wide variety of friends, including the bus 
driver who customarily took her to town (R. 303), and 
the p-olieeman on the eorner, whom .she frequently invited 
to the coffee shop· for a cup of coffee (R. 28). She also 
befriended and performed acts of kindness toward a 
cripp·led boy 'vho lived at the ·Oakland I-Iotel (R. 284). 
She was a fan of the Salt Lake City Bees. Baseball 
Team. The year it vYon the championship she frequently 
attended the games \vith Mr. Beam. To,vards the end 
of the season she gave a party for the entire team (R. 
369, 376, 377) 0 
l\1·able F. Bridge, Ada's mother-in-la,v, testified that 
Gail visited at her home on many occasions (R. 786). 
n{rs. Bridge r·aised canary birds and Gail (beeame inter-
ested in them. On one occasion Gail purchased a S-outh 
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.American bird from her for the sun1 of $25.00 (R. 787). 
Gail took care of :Jirs. Bridge•s birds for one n1onth when 
Jlrs. Bridge \Yas hospitalized. She returned the birds to 
2\Irs. Bridge in good condition (R. 788). 
Gail belonged to a Canasta Club consisting of her-
self, 1\.da Bridge, Ada's n1other :Jirs. Leavitt, Ada's 
sisters \Vanda Bollschweiler, Dorothy Sheets and Geral-
dine 1-Iatch (R. 764). The club Inet once a \Yeek, usually 
on Tuesday, played Canasta and had lunch. The six Inein-
bers ''Tould take turns having the club at their home. 
When it "Tas Gail's turn to entertain she \vould take the 
club me1nbers out to lunch and they w·ould return to her 
home to pla:y Canasta. It \:vas custornary for Gail to keep 
score for the club. The six }adies \vould play in teams of 
three (R. 764, 765). Gail mingled with the other ladies 
and conversed \vith them freely (R. 629). 
~Irs. Frank invited Gail to visit at her hon1e several 
tin1es. On one occasion she took Gail to the Alpine Lodge 
at J.lta. for dinner. Gail ordered her (nvn food. Once the 
Franks took thei1· pet lion, Major, to the S\van home to 
sho\Y it to Gail. On another occasion .Jf rs. Frank invited 
Gail to her ~birthday party (R. 3~4, 361). 
:Jirs. \\ragstaff testified that she accompanied Gail 
to .Jirs. Frank's birthday party; that Gail joined the 
other ladies at lunch and participated freely in their 
conversations (R. 688). 
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Dr. and Mrs. Frank accepted gifts fron1 Gail. On onp 
occasion Gail made them a gift of a ;boxer dog. Gail also 
made the Franks a gift of a miniature lion in memory of 
the lion named Major (R. 582). Dr. and Mrs. Frank 
visited at Gail's home on five or six occasions and played 
·Canasta with her (R. 580). 
Clair Mortensen testified that over a period of ten 
years, until Gail's death, he, his wife and daughter paid 
a S'Oci,al visit to Gail on Christmas morning and that Gail 
and his daughter exchanged Christmas gifts (R. 470, 
471). 
Gail's Properties and Her Business Activities 
During the years following her mother's death, 
Gail's father managed the properties (R. 113, 114). Ho\Y-
ever, he was anxious to lay down these responsibilities. 
In the year 1940 he turned over many of his responsi-
bilities to Gail,and Judge Armstrong. Judge Armstrong 
a:ssisted Gail and according to Theo "taught her a great 
deal" about managing the business (R. 114, 15.6). 
Ott~o Michaelis, a barber ·and tenant, testified that 
for a considerable period of time Gail collected the rents 
herself, and would prepare and give hin1 a reeeipt in the 
correct amount (R. 379, 380). He further testified that 
he signed his lease with Gail, had some discussions W'ith 
her about re1nodeling, and that Gail told hin1 that any 
remodeling vvould have to stay 'vith the place nt the end 
of the lease (R. 384, 385). 
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H. P. Kipp, Assistant Vice President and head of 
the property 1nana.gement departrnent of Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company for 18 years, testified that he had known 
Gail Swan as ~a customer of the bank for a long period 
of thne ( R. 773, 77 4). In Octo her of 1949 Gail came to 
the bank and requested that the bank handle her pro-
perties in a managerial capacity (R. 121, 122, 774, 775 ). 
In connection with the proposed property rnanagement 
agreement, a meeting at which Gail \Vas present, vvas 
held at the hank and the terrns of the agreement dis-
cussed. Gail took the agreement ho1ne vvith her and later 
returned stating that it was acceptable. At that time she 
told Kipp that she was surprised she hadn't thought a 
long time before of having her property n1anaged, 
in vie-vv of the fact that the cost \vas so nominal. 
She gave Kipp a -vvritten report containing a list of her 
properties and the revenues derived therefrom. He 
stated that in his ~opinion Gail had prepared the report 
(R. 778, 779). 
During the ti1ne that Tracy's managed Gail's pro-
perties she had a nun1ber of discussions with Mr. Kipp 
concerning policy matters. lie testified that she kne\v 
and understood the subject matters being discussed; that 
she made recommendations which were reasonable and 
which were followed by the bank (R. 780). l-Ie gave as 
his opinion that Gail was mentally competent to enter 
into leases and other types ·of agreemen~ that she was 
aware of what was happening, knew the details and could 
understand thern (R. 782). On rnany occasions Gail \Yould 
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con1e to ~Ir. ICipp's office upstairs 1n order to discu~~ 
her business affairs (R. 781). 1\Ir. l{ipp sent periodic 
reports to Gail at the end of every calender 1nonth (R .. 
785). 
On one occasion a dispute arose betvveen Gail and 
Joe Rosenblatt over a drivevvay ,between their properties 
located at the southwest -corner of 7th South and State 
Streets. Mr. Kipp ha.d ~a meeting with Gail and Rosen-
blatt and their differences where adjusted at that meet-
ing. Gail seemed to understand the nature of the ·contro-
versy and expressed her opinion relative to vYhat she 
thought should be done. Kipp testified that her judg-
ment in regard to this dispute was good (R. 776, 777). 
The managernent agreement with Tracy's continued 
until March 31, 1950, at "\vhich tin1e a n1isunderstanding 
over a deposit occurred betv1een Gail and Tracy's (R. 
122, 783). On Aprill, 1950 management \Yas transferred 
by Gail to \\Talker Bank ~and Trust Company (R. 779). 
Clair Mortensen had kno\vn Gail S'van for approx-
in1ately 18 years prior to her death ( R. 468, 689). Fron1 
1937 to 1949 Gail averaged once a \Yeek stopping at the 
;bank to discuss business. l-Ie started preparing Gail's 
incon1e tax returns in the year 1935. O-ccasionally he 
would go to Gail's ho1ne to discuss various business 
affairs. He testified that jn his dicussions ''Ti th her per-
taining to business, her horne life and current events, 
her 1nind \vas elear. He al~o testified that fron1 1937 to 
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1951 he prepared Gail's 1ncome tax returns; that she 
kept tvvo books, one a large size cash journal in which 
she kept a record of her monthly collections, and a smaller 
book in \Vhich she kept under separate headings lists of 
her expenditures, such as taxes, repairs, maintenance, 
contributions, telephone bills, etc. From these records 
and also the information that Gail would give him orally 
1\Iortensen -vvas able to prepare hHr income tax returns. 
He stated that in connecti~on with her expenditures and 
n1atters pertaining to her business "her me1nory was 
good" (R. 469-474). 
Mortensen last savv Gail's records and record books 
sometime betvveen January and March of 1951. On this 
occasion Gail brought the books to the bank and he used 
them in preparing her tax returns. Thereafter he re-
turned the books to her (R. 475). 
l\Iortensen worked out a .budget "\vith Gail which 
she follo-vved "pretty well." HH stated that she vYas 
cautious in business 1natters (R. 4 75). 
l\Iortensen testified that "~hen Walker Bank and 
Trust Co1npany assurned management of Gail's pro-
perties he accornpanied her on a visit to each of her 
properties; that she gave him from memory the rentals 
collected from each tenant; that a later check revealed 
that she vYas accurate concerning these matters ; that 
there were ten or tvvelve tenants in her properties and 
that the rentals varied with the property. He dis-cussed 
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with Gail the various proVIsions of the management 
agreement which she signed. In his opinion she fully 
understood the terms of the agreement. In connection 
with the insurance on the properties he stated that Gail 
expressed an interest in giving the insurance ~business 
to a friend, Mr. Ingberg (R. 481-485, Ex. 12). 
Between 1937 and 1950 Mortenson discussed from 
twelve to fifteen leasing transactions with Gail. He 
stated that in his opinion she fully understood the 
content and purport of these documents. He festified 
(R. 476-478) : 
"Q At any time in your experience \vith 
her did she, prior to her execution of them, 
evidence any misunderstanding or any indefinite-
ness in mind as to what they meant·~ 
''A No. She \vas very farmiliar \Yith the 
properties. 
* * * ".':' 
' ' Q I'll ask you to state, fron1 your experi-
ence with her, whether or not in your opinion 
she had what we ·commonly say a n1ind of her 
own~ 
' 'A She did. '' 
In the latte-r part of 1950 Mortensen had a series 
of discussions with Gail regarding a nevv leasing agree-
Inent on Olie 's place. He testified that Stevenson, the 
lessee, desired to make some imp·rovements on the build-
ing providing Gail would give hiln a longer lease; that 
Gail was cautious and expTessed n1isgivings about giving 
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hirn a long-tin1e extension on the lease; that he had a 
nurnber of telephone conversations, one conversation at 
her home and one at his office with Gail; that eventually 
Gail informed hirn that if Stevenson was willing to spend 
his money irnproving the property she believed he was en-
titled to have an extension of the lease. Eventually the 
lease was approved. Theo signed as a vvitness to this 
document (R. 477-481, 739, 740). 
Mortensen gave an opinion concerning Gail's corn-
petency to handle her business affairs as follows (R. 
491, 492) : 
'' Q What is that opini~on ~ 
''A That she vvas competent to handle her 
own affairs. 
* * * * 
''A That she was capable of reaching 
reasonable conclusions with respect to her own 
properties and business affairs.'' 
He testified that records were kept of rentals received 
from the tenants, that regular reports were made to 
Gail regarding the status of the vari·ous accounts, and 
that in his opinion Gail understood and appreciated 
the values of her properties (R. 478). 
Patricia Stevvart Pike, Macfarlane's secretary, 
testified regarding a conversation with Gail (R. 794): 
''A I reeall once she complained about the 
necessity of the office of price, not stabilization, 
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bank control. At any rate she was complaining 
rubout the paper work that had to be done and 
what rigmarole had to he gone through. * * 'H: 
* * * * 
''A Well, there was a girl that lived in her 
property on West Third South that was paying 
a very nominal rent, and she wanted to raise the 
rent on it as I recall, and she was upset because of 
all the paper work that had to be done and the 
time you had to wait.'' 
Exhibits 12 and 15 comprise a number of leasing 
agreements between Gail and a number of her tenants 
and indicate that Gail was entering into contracts with 
a variety ,of people involving a variety of problems 
over a long period of time (see also Exs. 14, 16, R. 7 40-
747). 
M,edical Testimony as to Gail's Mental and 
Physical Condition 
Dr. Edvvard LeCompte, an M.D., vvho had practiced 
as an eye, ear, nose and throat specialist from 1915 
until his retirement in 1948, called as a \vitness by con-
testant, testified that he met Gail Swan as a patient 
in the mid 20's and attended her from time to time until 
a fe\v years before his retirement (R. 385-388). He 
gave an op~inion that her mental development \Yas ''about 
eleven or twelve years, I should think.'' He stated that 
the averag:e person is -considered to have a mental 
development of 15 years, so that Gail \vould, in his 
opinion, have a mentality \vhich \Yas about "four-fifths 
of normal'' and further, that epilepsy does not neces-
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sarily result in rnental deficiency or rnental deterioration 
and that rnany persons with superior mentality are 
epileptics (R. 390-392). He further testified that on 
occasions Gail vvould discuss various subjects, among 
\\~hich vvas difficulty she ''Tas experiencing in c-ollecting 
rents on her properties and that he understood what 
she vvas talking ahou t ( R. 394, 395). 
Dr. \Villia.n1 D. Pace, an nLD., specializing in psy-
chiatry, and a rnember of the Arnerican Board of N eur-
ology and Psychiatry (R. 822), called by the proponents, 
testified that Gail was his father's patient from October, 
1948 until his father's death in July of 1950. During 
this time he savv her on a number of ·oecasions and on 
tw·o occasions examined her \Vhile his father was away 
on trips (R. 822). She was being given anti-convulsion 
drugs, principally mesantoin and phenobarbital for her 
epilepsy ( R. 823). 
Follovving his father's death Gail ean1e to his office 
on tvvo occasions in August and September of 1950. 
In the \Vinter of 1950 he was called to see her at the 
L.D.S. Jiospital while she was under treatment by Dr. 
Cowan for cancer. Dr. Cowan requested Dr. Pace to take 
care of the anti-convulsion control (R. 823). He testified 
that the various anti-convulsion control drugs would have 
no adverse effect when taken over a period of tirne; 
that phenobarbital is a sedative and vYould 1nake the 
average person drovvsy and sleepy, but vvhen taken over 
a period of time a person vvould becorne used to it and 
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it would no longer have that effect (R. 823, 824). lie 
testified that Gail "ras of a low average intelligence, but 
that she -vvas not feeble-minded; that she was able to 
carry on a coherent eonversation and that there was 
nothing about her that would indicate she was irra-
tional in any way. He saw no evidence of insanity (R. 
824, 825). He placed her mental development in a range 
·of 11 to 13 years (R. 826). 
Joseph Emory Frank, a physician and surgeon, 
called by contestant, testified that he w·as first called 
upon to treat Gail ·on October 9, 19·50. On this occasion 
his diagnosis was that there w·as a mild obstruction from 
adhesion and/or a carcinoma (R. 446). After h·e had 
treated her for ·a short period of time she commenced 
feeling better. He kept her on mesa:ntoin and pheno-
'barhital to control her epilepsy. These tablets were to 
·be taken morning, noon and night (R. 449). The doses 
were varied from time to time. Her epilepsy was of 
the petit mal type in which the seizures are less in 
severity an·d duration than the grand mal type·. The 
drugs kept the seizures under satisfactory control (R. 
466, 527-529). She gave him a previous history ·of only 
one attack in six months (R. 445, 448). He made 60 
p·rofessional calls on Gail in the year 1951, and perhaps 
12 or 15 nonprofessional calls at her home in 1951 and 
1952 (R. 454, 455). He stated that during the period 
of his treatment Gail was .going1 progressively down-
hill. A1nong other things she had anemia, kidney and 
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bladder infections (R. 455, 456). Dr. Frank's opinion was 
that her mental age was 12 to 15 years (R. 4'65). He 
testified that her physical infirmities and affli,ctions 
would not effect her in any way mentally. 
Adolph M. Nielsen, physician and surgeon, and 
specialist in surgery, called on behalf of proponents, 
testified that he received a call from Macfarlane con-
cerning Gail in April, 1951 (R. 837). Macfarlane told 
him he had a client who \Vas making some ·changes in 
a will and vYho had expressed a desire to have an exam-
ination and asked if Dr. Nielsen would perform this 
service. He performed a physical examination of Gail 
Swan at his ·office on April 23, 1951. His office girl 
-vvas the only other person present. The e~amination 
revealed that Gail was in a good state of health (R. 
838, 839). \Vhile Dr. Nielsen was examining Gail his 
office girl called Dr. Roy A. Darke, who officed in the 
same building. Dr. Neilsen had made tentative arr'ang.e-
ments for Dr. Darke to make a 1nental examination of 
Gail several days earlier (R. 804). Dr. Darke arrived 
and made a mental examination in Dr. Neilsen's pre-
sence, using questi~onnaires and tables for this purpose 
(R. 839, 842). In connection with this examination Dr. 
Neilsen stated (R. 839) : 
"A. Well, she said that she wan ted to leave 
her property to primarily three individuals-
Mr. Macfarlane, Mr. Kostopulos and her sister-
and she mentioned other people whom she desired 
to leave minor, or less. 
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'' Q Do you recall their nan1es 1 What she 
said about them~ 
''A She mentioned, I believe, a 1\Ir. Bean1 
and a Mr. Bridges. Could have been others.'' 
In -connection \vith her mental condition he stated 
(R. 840) : 
"Q And would you tell us what your 
opinion ·of her mental condition at that ti1ne ''"as, 
please~ 
"A. Well, yes, I thought she was 1nentally 
sound, and certainly in the adult bracket.'' 
Dr. Neilsen sa\Y nothing about Gail that was irra-
tional and nothing about her which would indicate 
insanity (R. 843, 844). 
Roy A. Darke, mediC'al doctor and psychiatrist, called 
on behalf of proponents, testified that he· had interned 
at the U. S. Marine Hospital on Staten Island; h'ad per-
formed minor sur~ery at the M-arine Hospital in N e\r 
¥ork City for a year; 1Bp.ent six months at the Psychiatric 
Institute: attache·d to Columbia University in New York 
City; ten months at the U. S. Marine Hospital on Ellis 
Island; 26 months at the U. S. Medical Center in Spring-
field, Missouri, an·d 8 months at the U. S. Public Health 
Hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, specializing in psy-
chiatry, and that he belonged to the A1nerican Board of 
Psychiatry and Neurology, and on numerous occasions 
had testified in court as an expert in his field (R. 802, 
803.) 
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At 5 :15 p.m., on April 23, 1951, as a result of previ-
ous arrangements, he w.ent to Dr. Neilsen's office. Dr. 
Neilsen, Gail, Macfarlane and Kostopulos were p·resent. 
Before the ·examination Macfarlane read the will aloud 
and ~some questions were asked Gail pertaining particu-
larly to the property involvHd. During the examination 
Macfarlane and Kostopu'los left the office. He testified 
that his examination -consisted of a series of questions 
to rule out insanity and to evaluate Gail's mental status 
with respect to her history of epilepsy and to determine 
vvhether she ha:d the mental ability t~o understand her 
property and plan its distribution. The examination took 
approximately an hour. He further stated that Gail was 
very familiar with her p·roperties; had a definite and 
intelligent plan for their distribution in her will. He 
testified: "I felt that she did wish to do what she was 
sayinq she wanted to do with her property. That that 
was her wish. She was very calm, and there w·asn't anxie-
ty or tension as we talked to her. We talke·d to her pri-
vately .. W-e discussed the question of whether she was 
under pressure or force, or whether she felt that a.nyone 
w·as trying to ha.ve her do this. She said not. That this 
was what she wished to do." 
Dr. Darke also made a mental examination to deter-
mine Gail'~s inteliec;tual ability. The tests indicated that 
she had the intellectual ability of an average 12. year old 
person. He further testified that the average mental age 
at the adult level is about 16 (R. 804-807). Concerning 
Gail's e1notional stability he testified: 
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"A Well, in relation to her emotional maturi-
ty, there would be some restriction, you might 
say, by the mental age. She, however, was very 
very businesslike. She listed her properties and 
discussed them, and ·discussed rentals and dis-
cussed these variou~s p·eople that she wished to 
leave 1none·y to, dis.cusse·d p~eople that she was as-
sociated with, in-well, in a fash1on that would 
indicate that she was functioning at the level of 
her age, I would say." (R. 812, 813) 
He further te~s.tified that Gail p·robably had no dif-
ficulty handling her business affairs and that she could 
enter leases or ·agreements if the contents were explained 
to her in "not legal terms". (R. 814, 815). 
Lay Testimony as to Gail's Mental and 
Physical Condition 
Wanda Bollsch-vveiler, Ada Bridge's sister, and a 
1nember of t'he Canasta Club, testified (R. 769): "Her 
n1ental condition was. perfectly normal." 
Dorothy Sheets, an1other of Ada Bridge's sisters and 
member of ~the Canasta Cluh, al'S.o testified that Gail's 
1nental condition was "perfectly norn1al" (R. 771). 
Mrs. Carney testified that during Gail's regular ap-
pointments with her at the Paris Beauty 'Shop· she dis-
cussed family an~d friends, religion and politics. ~Irs. 
c~arney stated that she never felt there was anything 
wrong with Gail's mental condition "because she carried 
·on very intelligent conversati'Ons with me" (R. 817-819). 
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Os.car Beam testified that Gail generally did most 
of the cooking at home, and that .on ocCiasion's when he 
was at the Swan household he would help, her. After the 
evening meal he and Gail would play Chinese checkers 
or Canasta (R. 589, 590, 599'). He stated that he and Gail 
played Canasta with Dr. and Mrs. F'rank several times, 
and with the Bridges frequently, and that "if G1ail had 
a good hand she could play a good game" (R. 599). 
Grace Folden testified that after a period of hos-
pitalization, Gail expressed the belief that her doctors 
weren't helping her, and made the decision to change 
doctors. J\!Irs. Folden recommended Dr. Frank and Gail 
accepted the recommendation after first calling Theo (R. 
424). 
Alice Wagstaff te'stified that when she commenced 
working for Gail they had a conversation in which Gail 
stated her salary would be $125.00 per Inonth. Gail also 
told her that she could have the front bedroom, and she 
and Gail agreed as to the date she· would eommence work 
(R. 676). After Gail had recovered from her illness she 
'vrote Mrs. W agstaff''s monthly ehecks. and also gave, Mrs. 
Wagstaff a little gift at Christmas (R. 673). Mrs. Wag-
staff stated that on one occasion she· accompanied Gail 
to town for the purpose of purchasing clothing; that Gail 
tried on a number of dresse's, made her own selection and 
paid for the dress (R. 679). On another oecasion she 
accompanied Gail to town for the purpose of having the 
Swan initials p~laeed on some silverware; that Gail took 
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·a sample· so that the engraving could he eopie·d; that 
before they arrived at the jewelry store Gail met and 
introduced her to a friend she had known f'Or many years; 
that thereafter Gail took heT to a restaurant for lunch-
eon; that Gail ordered and paid for the meal. She also 
aceomp~anied Gail to town on several occasions when Gail 
had ap·pointments with the hairdresser (R. 679-682). She 
further testified that Gail planned all of the meals, ord-
ered the groceries and did much of the cooking (R. 684-
686). 
The· estate file indicates that Gail al·so kept an open 
account with the Woodland Market Meat Department. 
After her death the market submitted six slips, each 
bearing Gail's own signature, for payment (Estate File 
No. 34571). 
nirs. Wagstaff stated, "Well, my opinion is this, that 
'She was a bright person. If you compare it with the 
education that she had h·ad" (R. 700). 
Ruth C. Corbett met Gail in 1933 at the home of her 
mother, Anna Liljehlad. For many years Gail and her 
father came to visit the Liljeblad family and have dinner 
app1ro~imately twice a week (R. 510, 511). She testified 
that on one occasion she introduced Gail to Mrs. Lilje-
blad's unele and ·Gail "immediately went up and started 
to tickle him" (R. 513). Sh·e stated that in her op·inion 
Gail was. "very childish;" that she "giggled," ''poked 
people," "tickled," "was just silly." In her opinion Gail's 
1nental develop·ment was "I imagine more like the twelve 
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year old" (R. 514, 515). However, on cross-examination 
she testified that. outside of Gail's practice of tickling 
or poking men in the ribs she "seemed to be all right" 
(R. 517). 
Mr. Corbett testified that when Gail talked to people 
she "kind of giggled" (R. 542) a.nd that on one occasion 
when he went to GaiPs. for dinner she ''kind of tickled" 
him in the ribs (R. 549'). His opinion as to Gail's mental 
development was that she was about the age of an eight 
or nine year old -child (R. 552). Another incident which 
Mr. Corbett thought was odd was that ·one evening Gail 
called around 10:00 p.m., and stated that her sink needed 
fixing and asked him if he could help· her. He didn't 
think a normal person would make such a call (R. 553). 
:l\1rs. Frank thought it odd that on occasions Gail 
would borrow small sums of money from her. She ad-
Initted, however, that all of these loans were repaid by 
Gail with the exeeption of the last one (R·. 559, 560). Her 
opinion as to Gail's mental condition was, "Well, she was 
very childish" (R. 572). 
Mrs. Folden testified (R. 413): 
"A Her development was just like a child. 
Everyone babied her." 
Bell Martsolf testified that following 1923 Gail had 
the "app~earance of a child and the mind of a child'' ( R. 
263, 265'). She state·d that Gail was more interested in 
men than in women and thought that this wa.s odd (R. 
280). 
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Acc.oriding to Macfarlane, Gail's general health 'vas 
normal in 1947 (R,. 736). In 1950, other than during the 
periods of her hospiitalization, her condition was good. 
In 1951 she remained ·about the same (R. 737). In the 
S:p1ring of 1951 Macfarlane thought her physical condition 
was probably as good as any time he had known her (R. 
737). During this year she executed four or five leases 
and Macfarlane had a number of conversations with her 
relative to their contents (R. 737). 
Power of Attorney, Bank Books and Gifts 
In the latter p·art of March, 19·50 Gail had a conversa-
tion with Macfarlane at his office and stated that she 
wanted, to give him a power of attorney, so that if she 
needed any money or any instruments signed or anything 
done in her name he eou1d do these things for her (R. 
246, 723). 
On April 1, 1950 Gail signed a general power of 
attorney p~rep.ared by and in fav-or of Macfarlane (Ex. 6). 
Macfarlane testified fully as to each and every oc-
casion that he used the power of attorney. No discrediting 
evidence was offered to controvert his testll.nony in this 
regard. 
In 1950 Gail requested Macfarlane to pTepare three 
joint accounts (R. ·231). He testified (R. 158): 
''A She came in and said that she wanted 
rne to get some j·oin t tenan·c-y cards. She \Yan ted 
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to create three joint tenancies-one in her own 
name and in the name ·of her sister and her sis-
ter's husband, one in the name of herself and 
Dan Kostopulos and his wife, and the third in 
her name and in my name as j·oint tenants-and 
she wanted to have those three accounts as nearly 
equal as it was possible to do. 
'' Q Did you go about effecting those wishes 
of hers~ 
"A Yes sir. " 
The amounts placed in the three bank accounts, after 
interest of 1951 had been added were: The Hendee ac-
count $4,887.67; the Kostopulos account $4,797.50; the 
l\facfarlane account $4,797.50 (R. 247, 248). 
S.ometime after the joint accounts had been esta-
blished Macfarlane testified that Gail came to his office 
with Mrs. Bridge and Dan Kostopulos and stated that she 
didn't like the kitchen equipment she had purchased and 
was going to buy new equipment. She wanted a bank 
book. Macfarlane handed the three bank books to her. 
She chose the Hendee book and returned the others. This 
was the last time Macfarlane saw the Hendee bank hook 
(R. 24 7, 724, 725). 
On several occasions Gail came to Macfarlane's of-
fice, t·ook the Macfarlane and Kostopulos books, and 
made certain withdrawals. 
On one such occasion Gail withdrew $350.00 each 
from the Macfarlane and Kostopulos accounts to use for 
payment of taxes (R .. 249). 
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On -one occasion Macfarlane collected $1,000.00, plus 
court ·costs in an action against one of Gail's tenants by 
the name of W olfington. At Gail's request he p~laced this 
money in the Hendee account (R. 723). 
At the time of Gail's death the M·acfarlane account 
showed $4,597.17; the Kost·opulos account showed $4,-
597.17; and the Hen·dee account showed $493.89 (R. 232, 
233). 
Macfarlane also exercised his general power of attor-
ney in signing a leas·e with Tandy Leather Company. 
This lease was p-rep~ared by Walker Bank and the terms 
orally agreed upon by Gail, but she was unavailable to 
sign the lease. 
On another occasion Macfarlane received through the 
mail a signature card signed by Gail Swan, Ada Bridge 
and Joseph Lamar Bridge. He forwarded this card to the 
Union Trust Company (R. 234, 235). 
Macfarlane also exercised his general power of at-
torny in Ap·ril of 1951 when he drew from the Walker 
B·ank & Trust Company SO shares of Westinghouse Elec-
tric Company stock, which belonged to Gail, and 100 
shares of Utah Power & Light Company stock, ·w·hich be-
longed to Gail. He signed for these as Gail's attorney in 
fact. He did this at Gail's request. Gail later gave ~fac­
farlane the SO shares of Westinghouse Electric Co1np-any 
stock and l(ostopulos the 100 shares of Utah Power & 
Light Con1pa.ny stock (R. 753, 754). l\facfarlane testified 
(R. 236, 237) : 
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''A. * :::< * She asked me to procure the 
stock from Walker Bank and get it into my 
office, which I did, and I -called and told her 
I had the stock and •asked her what she wanted 
me to do with it, and she said she would -come 
down. She came down and asked ·me to get 
the stock in Utah Power and Light transferred 
in the name of Dan Kostopulos, and she told 
me that she wanted me to have the stock in the 
Westinghouse.'' 
* * * 
''A. She told me that I had been under 
great expense, and that she was apprehensive 
that I might lose the sight of my eyes, and she 
knew that that expense had been very hard on 
me and that she wanted to help out. 
* * * 
''A. And she said she would like me to 
have this stock, and I to1d her that I had gotten 
along with this matter, that we eould get along 
all right, and she said, 'No, I want you to have 
it, and I want you to have it now in your life-
time,' and so I accepted it. '' 
Macfarlane further testified that a short time later 
Gail also gave him $1500.00 in par value government 
bonds, stating that she wanted him to have them for 
his children ( R. 239) . 
l(ostopulos testified regarding the gift of the Utah 
Power & Light Company stock to him (R. 32·5, 326) : 
'' * * * She was downtown. She called me 
to pick her up, and I say: 'WheTe~' Say: 'In 
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the South Temple.' I say: 'I'm working right 
now, my wife ·she went out to eat, and she be 
back in a few minutes. Okay, about ten min-
utes,' and I went in there on South Temple, 
on the corner with ;a drugstore there, and I 
pick her up. On the way up home she give 
me the envelope and I say: 'What is that~' 
She say: 'Some of the good work you done for 
my father, and I give you this,' and I say: 
'Gail, I ·don't think so, you do that,' and S'he 
say: 'Yes, I think because you been more brother 
to us, and son to my father, for anyhody in our 
f;amily.' '' 
Kostop·ulos further testified in connection with 
$1500.00 in war bonds which Gail gave him, as follo\vs 
(R. 345): 
"Q. All right. Now what did she say be-
fore she give you the envelope~ 
"A. She say: 'Dan, that's another present 
for you for the good things you done for my 
father and me.' '' 
And again (R. 345) : 
"Q. Now, did you talk to Gail subsequently 
about those 1bonds? 
''A. I told her after"~ards, I say: ~Gail, 
it's awful nice of you to done that, but you 
should never done that.' Gail say: 'Dan, \Ye 
never repay you the things you done for my 
father and n1e for the twenty years.'" 
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Contestants made no effort to -controvert the fact 
that the gifts to 1Iacfarlane and Kost.opulos were freely 
and voluntarily made. 
Gail's Last Will and T·estament and the Codicils Thereto 
On l\1a.y 2, 1947 Gail came to Grant Macfarlane's 
office and told him she wanted to make some changes in 
her will and that she might as well make a new will. 
She had with her a will which had previously been pre-
pared either hy Judge Armstrong or Vern on 'Snyder 
(R. 202-205). During the conversation which ensued, 
Gail told Macfarlane that she knew of the accident he 
had had, was aware of his financial burdens, that she 
had acquired property located at 326 South State Street 
from her grandfather and that she wanted to leave 
this property to him. She told him she wanted the will 
to provide that her bills and expenses and the expenses 
of her last sickness should be paid. S.he also informed 
him that her sister Theo had other properties and that 
Theo's husband was a prominent newspaper man in 
San Francisco and that she wanted to leave Theo her 
harp and the sum of $500.00. She also stated that Jack 
Forsberg had been very faithful to the Swan family and 
performed rnany services for them and that she wanted 
to leave him the Swan apartments located on South State 
Street. She also stated that she wanted her father to 
have all of the other properties. She informed Macfar-
lane that she had known Clair Mortensen for many years 
and desired to have the Walker Bank & Trust Company 
as the executor of her estate (R. 714-717). 
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With respect to the execution of the will Macfar-
lane testified (R .. 717, 718): 
"'She returned, either th·at ~day or the follow-
ing day, in the- late· afternoon. It was nearly 5:00 
o'clock, p~robahly 4:30, when she came back in. 
She -came in and I gave her a copy of, or the orig-
inal of th·at type·d Will, and I took a copy, and I 
read through. She sat in a chair and I read the 
Will through and she followed, and I asked her 
if she desired to sign it, and she said that 
she did, so I called in my stenographer and 
asked her to get my offiee associate, but he was 
not there, s.o she went down the hall and got a 
young lady by the name- of Vivian W eggeland, 
who was working in·· the Infantile Paralysis 
Foundation offices, and asked her to come to my 
office, and I introduced Gail to Miss W eggeland, 
she of course already knew my office girl, who 
was then Patricia Pike, and I said to Gail: 'Is 
this. your Last Will and Testament~', and she 
said: 'It is.' And I said: 'Do you desire that 
these two ·p~e·rsons sign as subscribing witness.esf, 
and she said: 'I do.' S-he then executed the Will 
in their p-resence, an-d then each· of the witnessess 
signed in her p~resence and in the presence of 
each of the other p~ersons subscribing to the Will." 
Vivian Weggeland, Executive Se-cretary, S·alt Lake 
County National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, 
identified her signature on the will, but remembered no 
details- concerning the ~document (R. 835, 836). 
Patricia Pike Stewart verified Macfarlane's testi-
mony with re:sp~ect to p~reparation and exeeution of the 
will. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
She further testified that at the time ·of executing 
the 'vill Gail "seemed capable and competent" ( R. 799). 
In F~ebrua.ry of 1950 Gail came to Macfarlane's of-
fice and stated that she desired to revise her will. In the 
will of May 2, 1947 Jack F'orsherg had been left one of 
the Swan properties. He had passed away, thus neces-
sitating a change in the will. 
Gail told Macfarlane that the Swan apartments bore 
the Swan narne and that she wanted Theo to have~ 
that property and also the old Sw·an home located 
at 212 South 3rd East Street if her father preceded 
Theo in death (R. 206, 207, 718, 719). 
She told Macfarlane that Dan Kostopulos had been 
very good to her father and had been very good to her 
and that she would like to leave the painting "Girl at 
the Fountain'' and a set ·of Havilland China to him. 
She als.o stated that she wanted to leave the Oakland 
Hotel to Dan Kostopulos in the event her father pre-
ceded her in death (R. 721). At that time Macfarlane 
was not acquainted with Dan Kostopulos (R. 720). Re-
ferring to the Swan home at 1335 Perry A venue, she 
told Macfarlane that "You have one of your children 
married. They haven't a home, and Theo is never coming 
hack to Salt Lake City, she doesn't want the home, and 
I would like, if my father dies first, for you to have 
that home" (R. 720). She told Macfarlane that if her 
father died before her, she would like Macfarlane to 
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have the p·roperty located at 158 South 3rd East, known 
as "Olie's,'' to remove some of the financial burden fron1 
his shoulders (R. 720), and ·also the p,rop,erties located 
at 234 S.outh 2nd East and 342 East 2nd South. It was 
her expTessed desire that Macfarlane have the property 
located at 326 South State Street (R. 721). Gail then 
left the office and Macfarlane dictated the first codicil 
to his stenographer. Gail later returned and he read 
and dis:cussed the codicil with her (R. 721). Macfarlane 
then called in his stenographer and Irwin Clawson and 
in their p·resence asked Gail if the document was a 
codicil to her Last Will and Testament and whether she 
·desired that the two p·ersons sign the codicil as witnesses. 
S·he stated that she did. She then signed the codicil in 
the p·resence of the witnesses and they signed it in her 
p·resence and in the pres,ence of each other (R. 722). 
Irwin Clawson had known Gail for approximately 
three of four years. He did not discuss the will or codicil 
with her. He testified that he had no indep•endent recol-
lection about signing the codicil but identified his sig-
nature ( R. 834). 
Patricia Pike Stewart aga1n verified Macfarlane's 
testimony concerning preparation and execution of the 
first codicil. She testified that at the time the codicil 
'vas signed Gail seemed "capable and competent." And 
again, "there was nothing extraordinary about her. She 
seerned to kno\Y 'vha t she 'vas doing. She talked coherent-
ly. She acted norinalJ~~." (R·. 798, 799). 
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Shortly before Ap-ril 23, 1951 Gail again came to 
~Iacfarlane's office and s.aid she wanted to make some 
changes in her will. Macfarlane testified ( R. 727) : 
"A She told me that she h:ad always been of 
the opinion that Theo never wanted to return to 
Salt Lake City to live, but that on a recent trip 
of Theo's to Salt Lake City they had talked about 
Theo and Deek retiring in Salt Lake City, and she 
said tmatif that were to come about s'he wanted 
Theo to have the family ho1ne, and she wanted to 
change her Will and codicil so that that could he 
brought about.'' 
She wanted Theo to have the furniture and her 
curios (R. 729). 
Gail stated that Aunt Bell had visited her on occa-
sions and she wanted to leave $100.00 to her (R. 728); 
that the Bridges had been very close to her and had 
done many things for her and she desired to have the 
piece of property located at 234 South 2nd East go to 
the Bridges; that Kostopulos had continued to he very 
good to her and she wanted to leave him the p~roperty 
located at 212 South 3rd East. She also stated that if 
there was any other pToperty she wanted Theo to have 
it, and that if anything happened to Theo she wanted 
Macfarlane and Dan to share each one-half of her estate 
(R. 729). In eonnection with the fire insurance policies 
she told Macfarlane she thought they should go to the 
person that was going to inherit the real property. A pro-
vision was n1ade in the will to accon1plish this purpose 
(R. 728). 
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Gail informed Macfarlane that she had n.ot been 
entirely sa.tis:fied witli the funeral services of her father 
and she wanted Dan to handle her funeral arrange1nents 
(R. 729). 
At that time she informed Macfarlane that she 
desired to have an independent doctor examine her so 
that the will could never be: -contested. (R. 730). 
Macfarlane suggeste·d Dr~ Neilsen, who was the city 
physician. She asked him to make an appointment with 
Dr. Neilsen (R. 730). After the second codicil had been 
p·rep~ared Gail came to Macfarlane's office and he went 
oVier each item with her (R. 730). On April 23, 195'1, 
p·ursuant to appointment, Mrucfarlane met Gail and Kos-
topulos at Dr. Neilsen's office. Prior to this time Gail 
had been to Dr. Flrank's office. His card record makes 
note that at that time she was "feeling fine." (Ex. 19). 
Kostopulos and Ma:cfarlane sat in the reception room 
and Dr. N·eilsen took Gail into his inner office (R. 731). 
After she had been in Dr. Neilsen's office for approxi-
mately thirty minutes Dr. Roy Darke came through the 
office and went to Dr. Neilsen's office. She- remained 
closeted in Dr. Neilsen's office with Dr. Neilsen and 
D-r. Darke for app'roximately another thirty minutes. 
Dr. Darke then came out and asked Kostop·ulos and Mac-
farlrul'd to come in and he asked a number of questions 
of Gail while they were present and they were again 
excused. Dr. Darke then ca1ne out and said "She is 
' 
comp·etent to sign this will that you have prepiared." 
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Macfarlane said to Gail, "Is this your codicil~", and 
she answered "Yes." At that time the two doctors, Dan 
Kostopulos, Grant Macfarlane and Gail 'Swan were pre-
sent. She signed and the· two doctors then affixed their 
signatures in each others p~resence ·and in Gail's presence 
(R. 331, 731, 806-814). 
Before consi·dering th·e various legal matters p~er­
taining to this case we call attention to the fact that Gail 
had the absolute right and pTivilege of disposing of her 
property by will in such manner as she desired. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 553, 
558, the court said : 
":!(~ * * The judgment of the jury may be 
sounder and wiser than that of the father, hut 
that is no reason whatever for substituting the 
judgment of the former for that of the latter. 
The law of this state gives 'every person over 
the age of eighteen years, of sound mind,' the 
right to dispose of his p~roperty by will as to 
him seem~ just and right. If this right may be 
invade·d simp1y because a court or jury may not 
be able to a:gree with the testator in the manner 
he· has disposed of his property, or because he 
has not made an adequate allowance for a specific 
purpose, then the right had better be abrogated 
entirely. The Legislature might do so, but courts 
cannot." 
In re Hansen's Will (decided Aug. 9, 1917), 50 
Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256, 260: 
" * * * If h·e was of sound and disposing 
mind and me1nory when he made it, and the jury 
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found that he was, then, under the law, he had 
the sole right to choose the objects of his bounty, 
and it is utterly immaterial whether what he did 
is approved or disapp~roved by either court or 
jury. That right it is the duty of the courts to 
protect and enforce, and not to fritter it away by 
entering a judgment which perhaps reflects only 
their own views, or the views. of the jury, regard-
ing the disposition a testator should have made 
of his p~rop.erty. '' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI·CIENT TO SUPPOR·T THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT GAIL SWAN LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
AT THE TIMES SHE EXE·CUTED THE WILL AND CODI-
CILS. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI·CIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT GAIL SWAN WAS UNDER THE FORCE OF UNDUE 
INFLUENCE AT THE TIMES SHE EXECUTED THE WILL 
AND CODICILS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI·CIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT GAIL SWAN LACKED TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
AT THE TIMES SHE EXE·CUTED THE WILL AND CODI-
CILS. 
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Burden of Proof 
The burden of proving lack of testa1nentary capacity 
by a preponderance of the evidence rests upon the con-
testant. 
In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pae. 256, 258, 
the court said : 
"Upon who1n ultiinately rests the burden of 
proof in case the mental capacity of the testator 
is made an issue the authorities are not in har-
mony. In some jurisdictions the same rule is 
adopted respecting the burden of proof on the is-
sue of insanity in a will contest that prevails in a 
criminal prosecution where insanity is a defense, 
which is that the burden ultimately rests upon the 
proponent to show that the will is the product 
of a sane mind by a preponderance of th·e evidence 
on that issue. Such is the rule that is laid down by 
Mr. Schouler in his excellent work on Wills, etc., 
in volume 1 (5th Ed.) Sec. 17 4. Ther.e are, how-
ever, numerous authorities to the contrary in 
which it is held tha.t the burden of proof rests upon 
him who makes the allegalion and that he must es-
tablish the fact of insanity by a prepond:erance of 
the evidence. This court, in will contests, is com-
mitted to the latter doctrine." 
·See also In re Estate of Van Alstine, 26 Utah 193, 72 
Pac. 942; Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 
553; 57 Am. Jur. 570, Wills, Sec. 856. 
Test of Testamentary Capacity 
Whether a person is of sound mind depends on cer-
tain legal tests. These tests are outlined In re H a.nson' s 
Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 P. 2d 1103, 1116 as follows: 
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"* * * The true test is as to whether the testa-
trix had 'sufficient mind and memory (at the time 
of making the will) to remember who were the 
natural objects of her bounty, recall to mind her 
prop·erty, and dispose of it understandingly ac-
cording to some plan formed in her mind. * * *" 
See also In re Butta1rs' Estate, ______ Utah ______ , 261 P. 
2d 171. 
Gail Had Sufficient Mind and Memory to Det·ermine 
who were tbe Natural Objects of Her Bounty 
Gail was well oriented with respect to her friends, 
relatives and business acquaintances. She had retained 
Grant Macfarlane as her counsel in the year 1944, after 
he was recommended by a mutual acquaintance (R. 187). 
He rep-resented her in a numbe-r of matters and later 
made the acquaintance of her father and also represented 
him on occasions. Macfarlane prepared Mr. Swan's will. 
He was a frequent and welcome visitor in the Swan house-
hold. Likewise his wife and children became well ac-
quainted with Gail and her father. Gail relied up·on him 
for advice in both business and private affairs (R. 195, 
196, 200, 711-713). 'She devel?ped a sincere affection for 
him as illustrated hy Mrs. Folden's testimony that the 
evening Gail found Macfarlane was to undergo a serious 
eye operation at San F'rancisco, Calif.ornia she was so 
up.set she had one of her 1nost severe epileptic attacks (R. 
432). This is confirmed by Dr. Frank's card under date 
of January 3, 1951 wherein he records., "E.p,ileptic at-
tack during night - Has been worrying about lawyer 
friend's eyes." (Ex. 19). 
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Gail and her father had kno,vn Dan Kostopulos for 
ahnost twenty years (R. 318). This acquaintance gradu-
ally developed into a close friendship. Kostopulos ar-
ranged for Mr. Swan's hospitalization during his last 
illness, even rented a more comfortable bed for him, and 
a.s Gail's health began to decline in her later years he 
responded to her demands for assistance and aid willing-
ly. He furnished trans·portation to town for her various 
appointments. At her request he procured various com-
modities and necessities for her household. He and his 
wife called upon her frequently during her illnesses and 
visited regularly in her home (R. 269, 307, 319, 320, 341, 
342, 534, 817). These services "\vere greatly needed by 
Gail and no other person was in a p~osition to nor indi-
cated a willingness to perform them. Gail told l\1rs. Car-
ney he was her "very best friend." (R. 817). 
Gail's relationship with the Bridges was likewise a 
natural development, proceeding from that of mere ac-
quaintances to that of close personal friends. The Bridges 
were attentive to Gail's social and emotional needs. They 
visited her one to two times a week; played Canasta with 
her; took her to dinner with them at public places and 
to picnics. They allowed Gail to na1ne their youngest chil-
dren (R. 607, 627). They brought much happiness into 
Gail's life. There is no question but that Gail had de-
veloped a great affection for the Bridge family. 
Gail's relationship with Theo was not the norn1al 
relationship between sisters. They had not lived in the 
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same household since early childhood. Theo's life \Yas en-
tirely different from Gail's; she was happily married; she 
and her husban·d Deak occupied a p-ro1ninent social posi-
tion in ·san Francisco, while Gail lived a secluded life 
with her father until his death, and with various house-
hold companions thereafter. Gail had harbored the feel-
ing for many years that Theo was ashamed of her (R·. 
141-143-145, 293). Furthermore, Gail was well aware of 
the fact that Theo was financially secure ( R. 163, 165, 
166). 
She had told Mortensen many times that she did not 
intend to leave Theo a substantial portion of h"er prop-
erty (R. 487, 488). Mortensen also testified that Gail had 
told him she didn't want Theo to know anything about 
her business (R. 478). This coincides with Macfarlane's 
testimony that on one occasion when Gail found that he 
had called Theo concerning a matter, Gail stated that if 
he ever did this again he would receive his "'valking 
pap~ers." (R. 726). However, Macfarlane also testified 
that Gail had later mellowed in her attitude toward Theo 
and this is substantiated by the fact that Theo's inheri-
tance 'vas increased by the second codicil to approxiinate-
ly one-third of Gail's estate (R. 229). 
Gail's relationship, with. Oscar Bea1n \Vas that of 
pleasant, since-re friendship. Beam frequently joined Gail 
and the· Bridges at Canasta. He ate breakfast and dinner 
at the s,van holne ahnost daily, both before and after 
1\fr. Swan's death. He perfor1ned various services around 
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the ho1ne, such as gardening and the \vork of a general 
handy Inan. He considered both Gail and Theo to be his 
good friends ( R. 588-·590, 594, 595). 
Gail was deeply appreciative of the kindnesses and 
services rendered by her friends, and her life and person-
ality were such that her friends naturally became the ob-
jects of her bounty. 
Gail had Sufficient Mind and Memory to 
Recall Her Property 
Theo testified that Gail kne\v about her own proper-
ties and also Theo's, that Gail dis-cussed business rna tters 
vvith her father on oecasions \vhen Theo was visiting, and 
that Judge Armstrong had taught Gail1nuch about the 
handling of her properties ( R. 114, 156). Other evidence 
revealed that Gail collected her rents, gave receipts, and 
1nade bank deposits (R. 379, 380). 
Of pa,rticular significance was Mortensen's testimony 
that Gail kept books in which were recorded, in her own 
handwriting, 11he various properties and rentals, showing 
the dates and amounts of -collections, and also showing 
the various expenditures and debits, and his testimony 
that when Walkers assumed n1anage1nent of Gail's prop-
erties she took him to each property, informed him ac-
curately of the amount of rentals for each property and 
introduced him to the tenants (R. 472-475, 481-485). He 
stated that her business judgment was sound (R. 491, 
492). Kip·p corroborated l\fortensen concerning Gail's 
capability of managing her own properties (R. 780-785). 
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Dr. Darke and Dr. Neilsen's testimony was convinc-
ing and undisp·uted that Gail readily called to mind, 
·either hy address. or pop·ular name, each of her p·roperties 
without effort (R. 802-807, 837-844). 
Of significance are the many leasing agreements 
signed by Gail with her various tenants which were intro-
duced in evidence (Ex. 12, 14, 15, 16; R. 7 40-7 4 7). The 
evidence is overwhelming that ·Gail was fully capable 
of recalling to mind her p·roperty. 
Gail had Sufficient Mind and Memory to Dispose 
of Her Prop·erty Understandingly According to 
Som·e Plan Form·ed in Her Mind 
The will of May 2, 194 7 left the property located at 
708-710-712 s.outh State Street to Jack Forsberg (Ap-
p·endix 1). Between execution of the will and first codicil 
Forsberg died (App·endix 4). As a result, when the first 
codicil was prepared on February 20, 1950, Jack Fors-
berg was deleted from the will. On June 30, 19·50, Gail's 
father died (R·. 119). Up to this time her father had been 
the largest beneficiary of her will, and except for the 
South State Street property willed to Grant Macfarlane, 
Macfarlane, Kostop·ulos, and Theo were only residuary 
legatees. (Appendix 1, 2). 
On April 23, 1951 the second codicil 'va.s executed 
(Ap·pendix 3). Bet,veen the prep·aration of tl1e first codi-
cil and the second codicil Gail had learned that Theo and 
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Deak's retirement (R. 727). Furthermore, Gail's attitude 
toward Theo had mellowed considerably since her avowed 
intention not to re1nen1ber Theo substantially in her will 
as expressed to Mortensen (R. 229). F'or these reasons 
Gail withdre\v the family home at 1335 Perry Avenue 
from Macfarlane and willed it to Theo ( R. 727). In the 
meanti1ne the Bridges had become important in Gail's 
life, had ad1ninistered Inany kindnesses to her and for 
this reason she \vithdrew 234 South 2nd East Street fro1n 
1facfarlane and willed it to Ada Bridge (R. 728). 
Following execution of the will on May 2, 1947, Gail's 
health began to decline. She was in need of assistance. 
She had no living relatives in Salt Lake upon whom she 
could rely. Through force of necessity she came to rely 
on her friends, and principally on Kostopulos (R. 341, 
407). Kostopulos performed services that were of in-
estimable value to Gail. He was "her very best friend." 
She needed Kostopulos just as every person in declining 
health and approaching old age needs the help and serv-
ices of so1neone and so it was that she remembered him in 
her first and second codicils. 
Doctors Darke and Nielsen questioned Gail at length 
in private prior to execution of the second codicil. They 
testified that Gail was capable of planning and did have 
an intelligent plan for distribution of her property. Ac-
cording to Dr. Neilsen she stated that she wanted three 
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people to share the substantial portion of her estate, to 
wit: her sister Theo, Macfarlane and Kostopulos (R·. 
804-807' 838) . 
Gail's reasoning power was demonstrated by a num-
ber of incidents that ap.pear in the testi1nony. We call 
attention to her conversation with Mrs. F'olden in which 
she expressed the belief that Dr. Cowan and Dr. Pace 
weren't helping her, and for that reason made the deci-
sion to change doctors ( R .. 423, 424). Of similar import 
was her conversa,tion with Mrs. F:olden regarding hair-
dressers and her decision to have Mrs. Carney fix her 
hair (R. 437). Another indication of her reasoning ability 
is seen in her statement to Mortensen that if Ted Steven-
son wanted to pay for improvements at Olie's place he 
was entitled to a longer term lease (R. 481). Sin1ilarly 
her statement to Michaelis that any ren1odeling would 
have to stay with the place after his lease had expired 
(R. 384, 385). Her thoughtfulness is de1nonstrated by her 
gift to the F 1ranks of a miniature lion in men1ory of Major 
Sheridan (R. 582). 
The will and codicils themselves clearly demonstratet 
th.at Gail was cap~able of planning and did plan reason-
ahly and intelligently the disposition of her property. 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment 
F'ollowing the trial court's meinoranduin decision 
counsel for contestant p~repared proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conelusions of Law and Judgment. \Tarious objec-
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tions to these docm11ents \Vere made by counsel for 1\:fac-
farlane and l{:ostopulos. The trial court. denied each and 
every objection. As we shall attempt to point out, the 
findings, without exception, are made either in the face 
of uniform evidence to the contrary, or in the face of a 
total absence of evidence and solely on the basis of coun-
sel's suspicion and vivid imagination. It is evident that 
the judge reached his conclusion and was willing to adopt 
any finding suggested by counsel which would tend to 
support him regardless of whether or not that finding had 
an evidentiary basis. 
The trial court has made general Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law that Gail lacked testamentary 
capacity on the occasions that she executed the will and 
codicils (Findings of Fact No. 25, 26, 27, 30; Conclusions 
of Law No. 1, 3, 5), yet has made no specific Finding of 
Fact that Gail ever lacked sufficient mind and memory 
to determine who were the natural objects of her bounty, 
or that she lacked sufficient mind and memory to recall 
her property, or that she lacked sufficient mind and mem-
ory to dispose of her property understandingly accord-
ing to some plan formed in her mind. 
We shall undertake to discuss the evidence pertain-
ing to every specific finding that either directly or in-
ferentially has a bearing on Gail's testamentary capacity. 
The trial court first found that Gail "never matured 
either mentally or emotionally," that she "had the men-
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tality of a child from 11 to 13 years of age," that she had 
a "childish and immature mind." (Findings of F·act 8, 
17, 26). 
An abstract consideration of Gail's mental and emo-
tional development would serve no useful p·urpose. 
Neither would any attempt to co1npare her intellect with 
a brilliant or an average mind. The evidence revealed 
without disp~ute that she knew and un·derstood the natural 
objects of her bounty, knew and understood her pToperty, 
and was fully capable of planning the disposition of her 
prop·erty. Counsel for contestant has made no attempt to 
meet his burden of p·roof on this matter. All the evidence 
is contrary to his position. 
The trial court was ap·p~arently impressed by testi-
Inony that Gail "tickled or poked men in the ribs," "gig-
gled," "kind of giggled," was "childish," "was just silly." 
(R. 513-515, 542, 549, ·552, 572). 
However, ''eccentricities an·d idiosyncrasies, however 
gross, ·do not constitute insanity, and cannot incapacitate 
one otherwise sound from making a valid will." ·S,ee In 
re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256. 
In re Whitworth's Estate, 110 Cal. Ap·p. 526, 294 
Pac. 84, 85, there was evidence that the testator was: 
"* * * 'feeble minded, * * * weak minded; * * * 
an immature in·dividual; * * * of unsound mind; 
* * * silly; * * * had the mentality of a boy not 
over ten years'; he had 'a silly expression on his 
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face; acted like a half-wit.' That as a boy, al-
though he had attended school for a period of 
'seven or eight terms,' he could read very little 
* * * could not spell and could only write his name. 
He would answer questions but he could not carry 
on a connected conversation ; * * * that he would 
give his money away. 'He gave a barber lady 
enough money to buy a ranch.' " 
The court, discussing the evidence, stated: 
"F:rom the foregoing sunnnary of the salient 
points of the evidence introduced on the hearing 
of the contest, it may be deduced that the testator 
was not possessed of the average amount of hu-
man intelligence; or, as expressed by one of the 
witnesses, 'he was a feeble minded, or a weak 
minded, individual' who, perhaps unsuccessfully, 
attended to his own personal and business af-
fairs." 
The court then concluded: 
"It would serve no useful purpose to herein 
consider the conduct, act by act, of the testator, or 
to attempt a comparison of his intellect with that 
of either a brilliant or an average mind. The~ pri-
mary questions which are to be given considera-
tion are : Was he possessed of that mentality 
which enabled him to understand the nature and 
situation of his property; to remember and to 
understand his rei a tions to those persons who 
would be the natural objects of his bounty; and 
did he realize the nature of the act which he was 
performing~ But of at least equal importance 
with the ~determination of such facts is the solution 
of the further inquiry as to whether the contest-
ants sustained the burden which was cast upon 
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them to prove the negative of such facts. A search 
of the record herein discloses evidence from which 
it is clearly inferable that at no time was the testa-
tor failing in his knowledge with reference to the 
nature, situation, or extent of his property. Nor 
is there the least indication that he was not entire-
ly cognizant of the existence of those p·ersons who, 
on the ·death of the testator, ordinarily would be 
expected to share in his estate. He knew them; 
had business relations with them; and at all times 
engaged in friendly social intercourse with them. 
F'ar from carrying the burden of showing to the 
contrary, the evidence introduced by the contest-
ants affirms the legal testamentary capacity of 
the testator by establishing facts vitally opposed 
to the ultimate conclusion necessary to a decision 
of the testator's incompetency. In such circum-
stances, no error was committed by the trial court 
in its order by which the motioy for nonsuit was 
granted." 
See also In re Peterkin's Esta.te, 23 Cal. App. 2d 597, 
73 P. 2d 897. 
Evidence as distinguished from accusation reveals 
that Gail lived a relatively active life. When she wasn't 
too ill she ordered the groceries, p·lanned and either pre-
pared or supervised prep,aration of the household 1neals 
( R. 589). She had a large collection of curios in which she 
was constantly interested (R·. 103). S.he took care of 
birds, not only for herself, but for a friend (R. 787, 788). 
She played the piano "well" and was able to play several 
pieces on the harp as well as the guitar (R. 102, 103, 631). 
She read the newsp·aper (R. 621, 691-693), played Chinese 
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checkers (R .. 589, 590); belonged to a Canasta Club and 
played Canasta very well (R·. 764, 765) ; was an enthusi-
astic baseball fan; planned and gave a party for the Salt 
Lake Bees team the year it won the pennant (R. 369, 376, 
377). She went to the hairdresser every two weeks and 
during the hour or two while there talked intelligently 
about politics, current events, religion and discussed 
fan1ily affairs (R. 817). On one occasion she took silver-
ware to the jewelry store to have it engraved and took a 
sa1nple spoon with her to show how she wanted it done 
(R. 679-682). She selected and bought he·r own clothing 
and dressed in good taste, ''Tas n1eticulous and clean in 
her person (R. 4 71, 629, 819, 820). She voted in the 19·45 
1nunicipal election; in the 1947 municipal election, and 
the general eleetion of 1948 ( R. 7 54). She Inade many 
friends. Apparently her company was acceptable to 
people in various stratum of society. Dr. and :iVIrs. Frank 
invited her to a birthday party held for :Thirs. Frank (R. 
52-±, 561, 688). She numbered a1nong her friends bank 
officials; the policeman on 3rd South and :i\Iain Street; 
the bus driver, on whose bus she frequently rode to town, 
and a crippled boy in the Oakland Hotel (R. 28, 303, 4 70). 
This woman, \vho was capable of engaging in so 
1nany activities, who was described by Dr. Darke as 
·'very business-like" and Bfunctioning at the level of her 
intelligence" at the time she executed the second codicil 
has apparently been found by the trial court to be so im-
mature emotionally that she couldn't meet the simple 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
64 
tests of testamentary capacity. This finding is a clear 
ind~cation of contestant's futile and empty search for 
evidence to justify an untenable position. 
The trial court found that "three of Gail's intended 
beneficiaries, i.e., Oscar Burnside Beam, Harold Hendee 
.and Joseph Lamar Bridge, were omitted from the second 
codicil" and concluded therefrom that Gail did not under-
stand who was benefitting by the second codicil (Finding 
of Fact 24). That the foregoing finding is supportable 
only by resort to the grossest kind of speculation and con-
jecture is elear from the testimony concerning execution 
of the second codicil as set fo:rth in the Statement of 
Facts. To review briefly, a me·dical doctor and a psychia-
trist had a convers~ation with Gail and subjected her to a 
psychiatric exan1ination that lasted over an hour. They 
testified that she discussed freely with them her various 
friends an·d acquaintances, recalled quickly and easily to 
mind her various properties, and expressed a plan to 
leave the bulk of her p-roperties to three p·eople, to wit: 
Theo, Macfarlane, and Kostopulos. The doctors heard 
the will read to Gail, and questioned her about the various 
pTovisions of the will, and expressed their opinion that 
she was fully capable of understanding and did under-
stand its p·rovisions. The trial court, however, found that 
the doctors 1nust have been mistaken solely because of one 
sentence in a letter signed by them and sent to Grant 
Macfarlane at a later date. The statement is as follo\vs 
(R. 806): 
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"She expressed an interest in making changes 
in her will and was aware of what this involved. 
She expresse·d an interest in leaving some ofher 
estate to Mr. Oscar Burnside Beam, Mr. Grant 
Macfarlane, Mr. Dan Kostopulos, sister and 
brother-in-law, and Mr. and Mrs. J. LaMar 
B·ridge. '' 
Gail knew the property left to Theo would bene-
fit both Theo and Deak. She had also remembered D·eak 
by placing his name as well as Theo's on the joint account 
heretofore mentioned. She knew the property left 
to Mrs. Bridge would benefit the Bridge family. Any 
other conclusion is unreasonable. Osear Beam spent most 
of his time at the family home at Perry Avenue. He was 
on the friendliest of terms with Theo. In withdrawing 
the Perry Avenue home from Grant Macfarlane and leav-
ing it to Theo, Gail knew she would not only benefit Theo, 
but would furnish Beam a lodgment until his death. The 
fact is that since Gail's death Beam has had a home at 
Perry Avenue, just as Gail planned (R .. 588). It is incon-
ceivable that Gail would consider leaving Beam, a man of 
great age and with no dependants, a substantial portion of 
her estate. She had previously discussed Beam's age vvith 
Macfarlane ( R. 733, 734). 
The trial court has read into one line in a letter a 
1neaning never intended by the authors, a meaning con-
trary to the evidence introduced by both contestant and 
respondents, a meaning which is unreasonable on its face. 
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The trial court foun·d that Gail was incapable n1en-
tally of understanding the langu,a.ge of a formal lease 
(Finding of Fact No. 7). This is perhaps the strongest 
and most specific of all the court's findings on the sub-
ject of Gail's mental competence. We point out that mem-
bers of the legal p·rofession on occasions find it difficult 
to understand the language of some forn1al leases, and 
even our courts are sometimes in disagreement as to their 
meaning. Kipp, however, gave an opinion that Gail was 
comp·etent to enter into leasing and other types of agree-
ments (R. 782). Mortensen discussed 12 to 15 leasing 
transactions with Gail between 1937 and 1950. His opin-
ion was that she fully understood the content and purport 
of these documents (R. 476, 478). Theo herself signed as 
a witness to one such lease, apparently without misgiv-
ings (Ex. 5). Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 16 show that over a long 
period of time Gail entered into contraets with a variety 
of people involving a variety of problems. Dr. Darke's 
testimony, which is the sole and only basis of the finding, 
is as follows (R .. 814, 815) : 
"A. Well, I think that she probably had no 
difficulty at all in collecting rents and handling 
the p·roperty in relHtion to, you might say, the 
month to month han·dling. She seen1ed to know the 
property, and to discuss it with ease. In relation 
to entering into leases or agreements or things 
of that kind, I think that if they would he explain-
ed to her in not legal tern1s, then I think she would 
know what they "\vere about and ''"·hat "\Yas happen-
ing with them. I think that if it were left to her 
to read and analyze that she would have some dif-
ficulty with legal ter1ns." 
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Here again the trial court, under the guidance of 
counsel for contestant, has drawn a few words out of con-
text and given them a meaning never anticipated by the 
witness, a meaning contrary to all the evidence. Beeause 
she couldn't understand legal terms she was mentally 
incompetent! 
The trial court also made a number of findings to 
the effect that Gail's mind was so influenced and coerced 
that she lacked testamentary capacity. These findings 
vvill be discussed in Point II of this Brief. 
Authorities 
A number of Utah cases have discussed sufficiency 
of evidence in establishing lack of testamentary capacity. 
In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256, 260 
(decided Aug. 9, 1917). Peter Hansen died, leaving as 
survivors two sons and three daughters. A little more 
than five months before he died he prepared his Last Will 
and Testament, leaving one MacGregor and one McCon-
nell as his residuary legatees, and also naming them as 
executors of his will. Following his death the will was 
presented for p:robate and three of his children protested 
the probate on the ground that he lacked testamentary 
capacity and on the further ground that the will was ob-
tained by fraud and undue influence. 
- The ease was tried before a jury and the jury found 
that Hansen vva.s of sound and disposing mind at the ti1ne 
of executing the will and also that said will was procured 
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by fraud and undue influence on the part of MacGregor 
and McConnell. The court reversed and remanded and 
held as a matter of law that neither undue influence nor 
testamentary incapacity had been proved. 
The evidence revealed that decedent was of Danish 
descent; that he was afficted with some throat trouble; 
was hard of hearing, and also had difficulty with his eyes. 
In the last 11 years of his life he always posed as being 
entirely destitute and everyone who came in touch with 
him sup~posed him to be not only poor, hut often times in 
abject want. The residu,ary legatees had befriended testa-
tor giving him odd chores and frequently providing him 
with meals, giving him newspapers and magazines to 
read. There was no direct evidence of undue influence be-
ing exerted. The court held as a matter of law that no 
undue influence had been exerted on decedent. 
Inasn1uch as the case was remanded for a new trial, 
the court also discussed the issue of testamentary capa-
city; observed that the testator 'vas 79 years of age when 
the will was n1ade; that in his own handwriting he gave 
the scrivener directions, p·ursuant to which the will was 
prepared; that in his correspondence with friends in Den-
mark he appeared to he sufficiently intelligent to make a 
valid will. A numbe-r of lay witnesses were called, all of 
whom were allowed to give opinions respecting testator's 
sanity ·on the date the will was executed. The court, how-
ever, noted that these opinions were no stronger than the 
evidence related upon which they were based and in a 
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nu1nher of instances pointed out that as a matter of law 
the basis for the opinions was inadequate to support the 
opinion. For example, one witness gave an instance oc-
curring 10 or 12 years before the death of the testator 
in which he had asked why the testator was not wearing 
gloves in freezing weather, and, the testator answered 
that he had no 1noney. This was the basis for the later 
opinion given and the court noted that such a flimsy basis 
'vould not support the conclusion of the witness. The 
court stated: 
"It is upon instances similar to those just il-
lustrated, and upon the facts that the testator was 
untidy in his personal habits and dress and at 
home, and that he had a miserly disposition and an 
entire lack of affection for his offspring, which 
were the principal grounds that induced the wit-
nesses to consider him of unsound mind. Indeed, 
the weight of the evidence is to the effect that they 
considered him so because he was unlike other 
men. He was not as they observed other men, and 
expressions of that character. The fact is that the 
evidence discloses eccentricities on the p1art of the 
testato'r which at times were induced and aggra-
vated by the fact that the testa tor was afflicted 
with the physical infirmities of being deaf, of hav-
ing some ailment of the thro1at and of the eyes. 
True, he had some other physical defects, but 
those were of minor importance. Eccentricities 
(J)'Ytd idiosyncrasies} however gross} do n,ot co·nsti-
tute insarnityJ a,nd cannot incapacita-te one other-
wise sownd from making a valid will. The finding 
of the jury that the testator wa:s not insane at the 
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tim.e he made the will is not only supported by, 
but it is the only conclu.sion permissible wnaer the 
evidence." 
In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac. 15 (de-
cided Nov. 1, 1927), involved a contest over the will of 
William Hersey F-ord, who died and left an estate con-
sisting of real and p·ersonal property. His heirs. and next 
of kin were his surviving wife, a son and ~an adopted 
daughter hy a fo-r1ner marriage. He left a will, leaving ~ll 
of his pirop~erty to his wife, except the sum of $1.00 each 
to the children. The children contested the will. A jury 
found that deceased was not of sound and disposing mind 
and th,at the will was procured by undue influence. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded holding 
• 
as a matter of law that decedent had testamentary capa-
city and that there was no undue influence by his wife. 
Decedent had been p·reviously married and divorced. l-Ie 
practiced various sex orgies with his first wife and at one 
time had beaten her severely for refusing to indulge in 
his habit of sexual p·erversion. He had continued to in-
·dulge in various forms of sex orgy and perversions with 
his second wife. A ·doctor who had intimate knowledge 
concerning his condition and his sexual perversions, as 
they had been detailed to him by deceased, \vas of the 
opinion that a~. far as sex 1n'a tte-rs \Vere concerned de-
ceased was insane, but that deceased was able to conduct 
a rather extensive trucking business. The evidence all 
seemed to :be that he had a great deal of affection for his 
wife and defended her any time her character or repu-
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tation was assailed. The court, In holding contestants 
had not sustained the burden of proving testan1entary 
inca.pa.ci ty, stated : 
"* * * Even the testimony of Dr. Beer ex-
cludes the idea that deceased was insane in mat-
te·rs of business. The court is of opinion that the 
rna.king of a will and the disposing of property by 
will is a matter of business." 
In re Buttars' Estate (decided Sept. 26, 1953), 261 
P. 2d 171, 174, contestants appealed from a judgment ad-
Initting the will to probate not,vithstanding a jury's ver-
dict finding the testatrix did not have a sound and dis-
posing 1nind at the time of executing the will in 1945. 
Held evidence insufficient to support finding of lack of 
testamentary capacity at time of making will. The court 
stated: 
"S·ometirne in 1940, testatrix who was then 75 
years of age beca1ne very ill and was hospitalized 
for a number of vveeks suffe·ring from kidney trou-
bles, high blood pressure and hardening of the 
arteries. After she left the hospital her memory 
appeared poorer. She did not recognize so1ne of 
her grandchildren who had bPen away for som.e 
years on 1nissions for their ch1trch or had been in 
the .armed services, when they visited her ~f,]JOn 
their return. She suffered a great deal from head-
aches and would often repeat the san1e subject in 
her conversation. She accused so1ne of her daugh-
ters of taking ~and borrowing things when they 
hadn't. She would forget where she hid things. 
Once she hid the silverware in bed, and other times 
she hid edible such as fruit, sahnon, or vegetables 
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in the living room bookcase. She becan1e weaker 
p~hysically and as time went on she depended more 
~and more on Wallace to aid her in her business 
tranS'actions, although he was not with her when 
she made her transfers of her stocks and pur-
chased bonds for her daughters. Testatrix was 
again hospitalized in 1944, this time for pneu-
monia, and that year her children had a meeting 
to discuss her condition. At that meeting a;n older 
son suggested that a g·uard'ian should be apvpoint,e,d 
because in his opinion their mother Wias· not physi-
cally or ment~ally capable of harndling her affairs. 
None of the other children wanted this done, so it 
was agreed that the children would take turns 
coming to their mother's home to help· take care of 
her and that Wallace would continue to look after 
her business interests. One of the daughters testi-
fied that although in 1950 it was arranged that 
they sh·ould he paid for their services and the 
mother signed the checks for that and other neces-
sities she did not think her mother knew what she 
was doing or knew what property she had. 
''When the eldest son of testatrix died she 
showed no emotion at his funeral and about a 
month later executed the Will which is eontested 
herein, wherein she stated that the reason she was 
leaving his children only $1.00 each was because 
their father had failed to repay a loan of $1500 
which was more than would have heen his share 
of her estate. In this. connection it is noted that 
his share, if it were equal to that of his brothers 
and sisters, would have amounted to about $8000 
and that there was also evidence that the loan was 
p~robably rep·aid, even thou_gh testatrix had re-
tained the note and Inortgage evidencing the loan. 
It should be further noted that there was evidence 
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that in the notices of her eldest son's death testa-
trix was not mentioned an1ong his survivors and 
that this hurt her very much. 
"Testatrix had always been a frugal woman 
who believed that one should earn what he re-
ceived. Shortly after she executed her Will she 
made conveyances of a considerable part of her 
real property to Wallace and two of her younger 
daughters who lived near her. She also assigned 
some valuable bank stock and bought U.S. Savings 
Bonds for these daughters, giving as her reason 
for doing so that they had received worthless stock 
from their father's estate, of which she was one of 
the administrators, as part of their share in his 
estate. This stock was not worthless at the time 
of the distribution but became so within a few 
years thereafter. By 1951, Wallace was made his 
mother's agent on her checking account and she 
also made him a joint tenant on her savings ac-
counts. 
"The uncontradicted testimony of friends, 
neighbors and tradesmen was that in their con-
tacts with testatrix even after her illnesses she 
always appeared neat and understood what she 
was talking about; that she always knew what she 
wanted or needed and would take nothing else. 
The doctor who attended her in her illnesses and 
who saw her on the average of at least twice a 
year since her illness in 1940 until her death, testi-
fied that in his opinion she was competent during 
all that time except in March, 1952, a short tiine 
before she passed away, at which time she was 
extremely ill. 
"The jury did not find that the Will was exe-
cuted under any undue influence or fraud. The 
evidence related above is proof that testatrix 
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was ecc.e!J'!;tric in her action,s arnd forgetful at tintes 
of some thin_qs, but is utterly insufficient to sus-
tain the contestants' burden of proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that she lacked t-esta-
mentary capacity at the time she executed the 
Will. This is especially so in view of the positive 
testimony of the subscribing witnesses that she 
appeared to know what she was doing at tha.t tin1e 
and that she was alone with the lawyer when she 
made her wishes known, since the Will itself shows 
she remembered who were (the natural objects 
of her bounty' and that she d'isp!osed of her prop-
erty 'understamdingly according to som.e p·lan 
forrned in her mmd.' There being no question of 
fraud or undue influence in the formulating and 
relation of that plan to the lawyer, the mere fact 
that at times she was forgetful and eccentric and 
was weak physically and that after she made her 
Will she disposed of a good portion of her prop-
erty after a lifetin1e of careful saving is no proof 
that at the time of making her Will she lacked 
testamentary capacity. The court therefore did 
not err in admitting the Will to probate in view of 
the complete lack of evidence that at the time of 
making the Will testatrix lacked the mind to un-
derstand what she was doing." 
In re George's Estate, 100 Utah 230, 112 P. 2d 498. 
Certain children of dec.eden t pTotested admission to 
probate of a 'vill leaving the estate to t"To other child-
ren. The jury found dec.edent lacked testan1entary 
capacity and also that the will was the p-roduct of undue 
influence. Judgment was reversed 'vith directions to 
admit the will to probate. 
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Testator was 84 years old. His weakened physical 
condition necessitated guiding of his hand in signing the 
\vill. He was forgetful, suffered from pain and was in-
clined to cry when matters were not to his liking. In the 
opinion of lawyers, doctors, and subscribing witnesses 
to the will, testator was competent at the time of the will's 
execution. In commenting upon the evidence the court 
stated: 
" * * * At most it is simply evidence which 
along with other evidence might logically lead 
to an inference deceased did not possess test-
amentary capacity. Absent that other evidence, 
certainly this evidence is not sufficient of itself 
to offset positive evidence to the effect that 
decea.sed was possessed of testamentary capacity 
at the time he executed the will." 
In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452. This 
case involved the estate of Gail Swan's grandfather, 
Edward D. Swan. A granddaughter of decedent was the 
contestant and claimed that decedent lacked testamentary 
capacity and also that Gail Swan's father, Ulysses Grant 
Swan, had exerted undue influence upon the decedent 
which resulted in the execution of the will. 
The trial court found that at the time the will was 
executed decedent was of sound and disposing mind and 
was not laboring under any duress, menace, fraud or 
undue influence. The contestant appealed clai1ning that 
the Findings of Fact were against the great prepon-
derance and "\veight of the evidence. The facts showed 
that at the time the "\Vill was executed deceased was 83 
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years of age, was afflicted with hardening of the arter-
ies, diseased kidneys; that his mind was 1nore or less 
affected; that at times he had spells of unconsciousness, 
lasting several hours, said sp·ells occurring approximately 
a month apart; that when said spells were over his mind 
usually was clear enough to transact his business, collect-
ing rents which amounted to about $1200.00 per month, 
and depositing the money in the bank; that he had written 
the terms of the will in longhand and taken said writing 
to a scrivener, who had p-rep·ared the will and thereafter 
called two of his friends of long standing to act as wit-
nesses to the will. There was some evidence that dece-
dent was suffering from senile dementia. It also ap-
peared that prior to making the will on December 
23, 1911, decedent had deeded to Theo L. Swan a parcel 
of ground valued at $55,500. On March 31, 1911 decedent 
had deeded to Gail Swan a p·arcel of ground valued at 
$51,000, and on December 23, 1911 had deeded to pro-
ponent a parcel of ground valued at $72,000, and on 
ground valued at $10,000. 
The court placed strong reliance upon the fact that 
deceased continued to transact his business for several 
1nonths after he made the will, and held that the trial 
court did not commit error in finding that decedent had 
testamentary capacity at the tilne the ,,,.ill was executed. 
The court stated: 
" * * * The three witnesses present when the 
will was executed, whose testimony we have 
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quoted, say he was of sound 1nind and seen1ed to 
know what he was doing. If their testimony is 
true, then the medical experts were mistaken 
when they testified he had senile dementia. If 
he had senile dementia, and that disease deprived 
him of testamentary capacity, then the three wit-
nesses referred to were mistaken when they said 
he knew what he was doing "\vhen he executed 
the will. The question thus presented was one 
for the trial court. The court found that he was 
of sound and disposing mind. The finding is 
sustaine·d by substantial evidence." 
The burden was on contestants to establish by a 
prepondurance of the evidence that testamentary 
incapacity existed at the tinze the will was executed. 
See In re Klopstock' s Estate, 31 Cal. A pp. 2d 568; 
88 P. 2d 72'2; In re Lincoln's Estate, 185 Okla. 464, 94 P. 
2d 227. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT GAIL SWAN WAS UNDER THE FORCE OF UNDUE 
INFLUENCE AT THE TIMES SHE EXECUTED THE WILL 
AND CODICILS. 
Burden of Proof and Presumptions 
The burden of proving undue influence by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence rests upon the contestant. 
In re Hansen's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256, 
259, the court stated: 
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"The burden of p~roving fraud or force in 
the procuren1ent of a will (unlike the simple 
issue of testamentary cap~acity) lies upon those 
who contest the instrument; and anything which 
imputed heinous misconduct to a party con-
.cerned and interested in its execution ought to be 
fairly established by a preponderance of proof. 
As to un,due influence, in the usual and less 
offensiv:e sense, the burden of proving affirm-
atively that it operated upon the will in, q~testion 
lies still on the party who alleges it, either by 
direct evidence or proof of circumstances incon'" 
sis tent w·ith fair dealing.'' 
Grant Macfarlane occupied a confidential relation-
ship with Gail Swan at the time the will and codicils 
were executed. He p~repared the will and codicils and in 
those documents was 1nade a beneficiary. It has been 
contestant's position that the foregoing undisputed facts 
give rise to a presumption that Macfarlane exercised 
undue influence upon Gail s.wan which said presumption 
has evidentiary weight. Inasmuch as the trial court 
found in contestant's favor on the issue of undue influ-
ence in the face of a total absence of evidence, it is 
obvious that the trial court adopted contestant's position 
on this proposition. The Utah decisions are clear, how-
ever, that any such p·resumption was completely dis-
pelled by the testimony of the witnesses to the will and 
codicils that Gail "\vas not acting under undue influence at 
such times. 
In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230, 240. 
Plaintiff, the supposed grandson of decedent, filed an 
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action to set aside the will of decedent on the ground that 
he \Vas unintentionally omitted from the will. A jury 
found the issues in favor of plaintiff. Defendants, the 
executor and legatees of the will, appealed. Plaintiff 
sought to avail himself of the presumption that omission 
of a natural heir from a will is unintentional. The court 
instructed that said presumption must be rebutted by 
a prepondera.nce of the evidence. The case was reversed 
on the ground that said instruction was an erroneous 
statement of law and it \vas held that \vhen evidence 
concerning such a presumption is introduced, the pre-
sunlption ceases to exist. The court stated: 
"Now, it is the contention of the defendants 
that when the evidence heretofore referred to 
\vas adduced by them, the presumption created 
by the statute ceased and in no sense could he 
considered or weighed as evidence, and inasn1ueh 
as the respondent offered no evidence to refute 
or rebut the evidence so adduced by the defend-
ants, in affect relied only on the presu1nption to 
support a finding of an unintentional o1nission to 
provide for the respondent, and since on the 
evidence so adduced but one finding is permis-
sible, that of an intentional on1ission, the defend-
ants were entitled to a directed verdict. We think 
the contention must prevail. Certain it is thal on 
the evidence adduced a findin,r; was justified that 
the omission to provide for the respondent uJas 
intentional. In such case it is just as certain 
that the presu1nption created by the sta.t,ute had 
fnlly spent its force and could not be con,sidered 
as evi.dence or be weighed against that adduced 
by th,e defendants. 
* * * 
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"In charging the jury, the court in substanrP 
charged that if the jury found that the respond-
ent was the grandson of the testator, then be-
cause of the statute, which the court in substance 
stated to the jury, the resp·ondent was entitled 
to share in the estate of the testator as though 
he had died intestate, unless it was made ·to 
ap·pear that the testator intentionally omitted 
to p·rovide for him; 'and you are further instruc-
ted that the law raises a presumption that the 
omission is .not intention·al and such presumption 
must me rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence showing that such omission was inten-
tional.' Complaint is made of the charge in such 
particular. The respondent first urge'S that the 
exception thereto was too general and did not 
sufficently indicate the particular matters now 
eomplained of, and further defends the charge 
on the ground that it was not open to the crit-
icism made of it. We think the exception was 
sufficient to entitle the defendants to a review 
of the charge. The principal cornplaint made of 
it is tha.t the court thereby conveyed: the tho1tght 
to the jury that the presumption was itself ev-
idence, or had evidentiary value, which could be 
considered arnd weighed against w·hate.ver ev-
idence may have been adduced tend'irng to show 
that the omission to provide for the respondent 
was intentional, or at least in st~ch respect was 
1nisleading and confusing, which led to the pre-
judice of the defendants. We think the charge 
at least to a _qreat extent is open to the complaint. 
If it d'id not directly convey the thought to the 
jury that they could consider the presumption 
as evidence, it at least tended to give the jury 
the in1pression that in considering whether the 
et~idence addHced respecting an intentional oJnis-
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sian did or did not preponderate against or over 
the pres~~mption, the jury were permitted to con-
sider and w·eigh the presumption aga.inst such 
a.dduced evidence. What we have just said as to 
the office arnd function of the presumption, that 
when evidence i.s a.dduced resp•ectirng facts and 
circumstances concerning which the presump-
tion is indulged the presump·tion ceased arnd 
could not be considered of evidentiary value, it 
necessarily follows that the charge is erroneous 
and pre ju.dicia.l.'' 
In re Bryan's Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609. 
Decedent prepared a vvill, leaving his estate to St. Jos-
eph's Church at Ogden and naming F'ather P. F. Kennedy 
as executor. The vvill was admitted to probate and dece-
dent's sister entered a contest. Father Kennedy had 
visited decedent at the hospital after being asked for 
by him. Father Kennedy thereafter obtained the ser-
vices of R. J. Douglas, an attorney, who went to 
the hospital and then prepared the will. Decedent died 
a short time later. Contestant relied strongly upon a 
so-called presurnption arising out of the confidential 
relationship between the testator and Father Kennedy. 
The court stated: 
"This court is committed to the doctrine 
that, when facts a.nd circun~stances are s'how11 
concerning which a presumption a.rises or is 
indulged, the presumption ceases, a.nd the case 
is to be decided on the evidence introduced in-
dependently of the presumption; tha.t is, that 
the presum.ption is not evidence and has no 
weight as evidence. In re Newell's Estate, 78 
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Utah 463, 5· P. (2d) 230, a1n.d S'tate v. Green, 78 
Utah 463, 6 P. (2d) 177. If there is evider~Ace that 
the beneficiary of the will was in confidewtial 
relationship. with. the testa.tor, and w·as actiV'e in 
the p:rep~aration of the will, there arises front 
proof of such acts .and relationship a suspicion 
w·hich amo'IJJn.ts to a p·resump~tion of fact, but 
w·hich m.ay nevertheless be overcome by evidence 
that the will was the free act of the testator. The 
presump~tion, however, 'disappears, and is not 
to be weighed aga.inst evidence when additional 
fiacts ar·e adduce:d which show the circu1nstances 
and cond-itions under which the will w·as made. 
The case then must be d.ecided on the facts. If 
the evidence is undispttted, · and if but one con-
clusion or inference is properly and reasonably 
deductible therefrom, it is for the court an(l 
not for the jury. 
* * * 
" * * * Undue influeVJtce 1nust be proved. It 
will not be presumed from 1"nere interest or 
opportunity. The opportunity to exercise in-
fluence, wnless combined with circ1Jilnsta;nc:es 
tendino to show its exercise, affords no presump-
tion th.at it wa;s in fact exercised. 40 Cyc. 1151; 
1 Pa.ge on Wills ( 2d Ed.) 1226; In re Clark's 
Estate, 5 Misc. 68, 25 N. Y.S. 712; Severance v. 
Se·verance, 90 Mich. 417, 52 N.W. 292; Fischer 
v. Sperl (In re Sperl's Estate), 94 Minn. 421, 
103 N.W. 502; In re Black's Estate, 132 Cal. 
392, 64 P. 695. 
"Bryan, if o{ sound and disposino m.ind 
and memory, had a right to 'dispose of his pro-
perty as he saw fit. He could disinherit h·is 
sister if he wished. The will cannot be set aside 
on the m.ere suspicion that the priest called to 
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his bedside suggested to him a certain disposition 
of his property. To vitiate the will, there ntust 
be more than mere influence or suggestion; it 
must be wndue influence. However exhibited, it 
must be such influence as to destroy the free 
agency of the testator and impel him to do what 
he would not have done had he been free fronl 
the control of such influence. The kind of influ-
ence \vhich will avoid a will has been referred 
to by this court in Anderson v. Anderson, 43 
Utah 26, 134 P. 553, 557, as follows: 'Undue in-
fluence may be established without showing any 
physical coercion or constraint. The influence 
that vitiates may be subtle and be entirely with-
out outward demonstration, but in whatever 
form it rnay appear it must, nevertheless, be 
Inade· to appear from c.ompetent evidence that 
the \vill of the one accused of practicing 
undue influence dominated the will of the test-
ator-that the testament is in fact and effect the 
will of the accused and not that of the testator.' 
''The rule is stated in 40 Cyc. 1144, as fol-
lows: 
'Mere general or reasonable influence over a 
testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to 
have that effect the influence must be 'undue'. 
The rule as to what constitutes 'undue influence' 
has been variously stated, but the substance of 
the different statements is that, to be sufficient 
to avoid a will, the influence exerted 1nust be of 
a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the 
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency 
and make him express the will of another, rather 
than his own. The mere existance of undue in-
fluence, or an op·portunity to exercise it, is not 
sufficient; S1tch influence mu.st be actually e.r-
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erted on the mind. of the testator in regard to 
the execution of t.he will in question, either at the 
time of the execution of the will, or so near {here-
to ~as to be still operative, with the object of pro-
curinq a will in favor of pa.rticular p·arties, and 
it must result in the making of testam.entary dis-
p-ositions which the testator would not otherwise 
have mad:e. No precise quantity of influence can 
be said to he necessary and sufficient in all 
cases, as the amount necessarily varies with the 
circumstances of each case, and especially does 
it vary accordingly as the strength or weakness 
of mind of each testator varies, the amount of 
influence necessary to dominate a mind impaired 
by age, disease, or dissipation being obviously 
less than that required to control a strong mind.' 
"And further with respect to one occupying 
a confidential relation: 'The influence o:ver a 
testator of one who is his wife, child, gardian, 
attorney, spiritual adviser, or who occupies some 
other confidential relation to him, is not neces-
sarily undue influence, although it 1nay, when 
couple·d with other circumstances, raise a pre-
sump·tion of undue influence; but the question 
must he determined, as in all other cases, by 
ascertaining whether the free agency of the 
testator has been destroyed.'" 
After considering the evidence the court affirmed 
the trial court's ruling in granting a motion for nonsuit 
this supporting the will. 
A late Utah case discussing presumptions is Tuttle 
v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. 242 P. 2d 764, 
769, where the role of the presu1nption that a deceased 
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person was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own 
safety is discussed. Thfr. J'ustice Wade, speaking for the 
court, stated : 
"The term 'presumption' is properly 'used 
to designate the assumption of the existence of 
one fact which the law requires the trier of fact 
to make on account of the existence of another 
fact or group of facts, standing alone.' 
''The ordinary presun1ption merely places 
on the party claiming the non-existence of the 
presumptive fact the burden of producing evi-
dence from which the fact trier could reasonably 
find the non-existence of such fact. In other 
words, it places on the opposing party the burden 
of going forward with the evidence or of making 
a prima facie case on that issue. If the opponent 
fails to meet this burden the presumptive fact 
should be assumed and the jury should be so 
instructed if the facts on which the presumption 
is based is established, but if the required burden 
is satisfied hy the opponent the presumption dis-
appears and the facts must be established from 
the evidence the same as though no persumption 
were ever involved and it is not proper in such 
case to even Inention in the instructions the 
existence of such presumption. This court has 
many times held that such is the effect of pre-
sumptions generally and of this presumption in 
particular. Of course, we must keep in mind that 
the facts on which the presumption is based are 
in evidence even though the presumption has 
been destroyed hy proof tending to show the non-
existence of the presumptive fact, and to the 
extent that they logically tend to prove the pre-
sumptive fact they may be considered by the 
jury for that purpose." 
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See also: 
State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177; on 
rehearing 86 Utah 192, 40 P. 2d 961; 
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. 2d 493; 
Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772; 
Frame v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 109 F. 2d 35·6; 
Buckley v. Francis, 78 Utah 606, 6 P. 2d 188; 
Sta,te v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 P. 2d 142, 
147; 
King v. Denver amd R'io Grande Western R. Co., 
116 Utah 488, 211 P. 2d 833; 
Christiansen v. Hilber, 282 Mich. 403, 276 N.W. 
495; 
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co., 50 R.I. 
43, 144 A. 884, 63 A.L.R. 334 ; and 
Annotation 95 A.L.R. 878 at page 880. 
·Other jurisdictions have adopted rules somewhat 
similar to Utah with resp·ect to burden of proof. 
In re Erickson's Estate, 140 Cal. App. 520, 35 P. 2d 
628, 631, (Aug. 30, 1934), involved an action by two heirs-
at-law to set aside a will on the ground of undue influ-
ence. It appeared that the vvill was prep1ared by Willia1n 
A. Monten, an attorney, and in the will William A. l\1on-
ten and his wife, who was also an attorney, were made 
beneficiaries and residuary legatees. The case was tried 
before a jury. The jury found that undue influence had 
been exercised. The District Court of Ap·peals reversed 
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for the reason that certain instructions to the jury were 
error and prejudicial. One of the instructions held to 
be erroneous is as follows : 
" * * * The attorney must, however, over-
come the presumption of undue influence by a 
preponderance of the evidence that no undue 
influence was used upon the testator to make the 
provision in the will for the attorney who pre-
pared it, or for any other person named as bene-
ficiary therein." 
The court discussed the foregoing instructions : 
"We are satisfied that the court erred in 
the giving of these instructions and thereby 
throwing upon the proponents of the will the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there was no undue influence ex-
ercised in the execution of the will, and that there 
was no undue influence exercised with respect to 
the provisions of the will referred to in the 
instruction No. 26. In Scott v. vV ood, 81 Cal. 398, 
22 P. 871, 872, the Supren1e Court pointed out 
clearly the distinction that exists between the use 
of the phrase 'burden of proof' to signify the 
burden of proving or meeting a prima facie 
case, and the use of the same phrase to signify 
the burden of producing a 'preponderance of the 
evidence.' The court said: 'And it is by no 
means safe to infer that because a party has the 
burden of meeting a prima facie case, therefore 
he must have a preponderance of evidence. It 
1nay be sufficient for him to produce just enough 
evidence to counter-balance the evidence adduced 
·. against him.' The court proceeded to fortifJa'ii'd 
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explain this ruling with various illustrations and 
quotations from other cases. These quotations 
need not be repeated here. 
''The same distinction above noted was 
pointed out by the Sup~reme Court of New York 
and applied in the contest of a \vill in the case 
entitled Matter of Connor's Will, 230 App. Div. 
163, 244 N.Y.S. 221, 223. Under circumstances 
similar to those in the case at bar, the court said: 
'Whether the attorney has explained satisfac-
torily or not, there still remains the question 
upon all the facts and circumstances whether 
the respondents have sustained the burden of 
p·roof on the question of undue influence.' 
"There can he no doubt that these erroneous 
instructions to the jury, considered in the light 
of the evidence, \vere very prejudicial to appel-
lant. It is far from certain that under proper 
instructions the jury would have rendered the 
same verdict against her. 
"For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
is reversed." 
In re Eakle's Estate, 33 Cal. App. 2d 379 91 P. 2d 
954, 958, (June 16, 1939), "Tas a \viii -contest in which a 
confidential relationship \vas established. A jury found 
undue influence to exist, and the appellate court re-
versed. The court, again discussing the subject of bur-
den of p~roof, stated: 
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"It is contended by appellants that the first 
two instructions are not correct statements of 
the law, in that: 'The contestants at all times 
have the burden of proving their case by a 
preponderance of the evidence and when they 
have made out a prima facie case the burden 
which shifts to the proponent is not to overcome 
their showing by a preponderance of the evi-
idence but merely to ·pToduce sufficient evidence 
to offset the effect of the contestant's showing;' 
and they cite Scar borough v. U rgo, 191 Cal. 341, 
216 P. 584; Valente v. Sierre R. Co., 151 Cal. 534, 
91 P. 481, and In re Estate of Erickson, 140 Cal. 
App. 520, 35 P. 2d 628. We agree with appellants. 
The instructions were erroneous." 
S.ee also In re Hampton's Estate, 127 P. 2d 38 and 
131 P. 2d 565, (June 25, 1942); Gu.m v. Reep, 275 Ill. 
503, 114 N.E. 271; In re Kindberg's Will 207 N.Y. 220, 
100 N.E. 789. 
Inasmuch a.s witnesses have testified fully concern-
ing the events before, during, and after execution of the 
will and codicils, and have testified fully concerning 
whether or not undue influence was exercised at the 
time of execution of the will and codicils, any presump-
tion of fact arising from the confidential relationship 
and the bequest to Macfarlane has spent its force and 
cannot be considered as evidence. Contestant has the 
burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
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Test of Undue Influence 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 43 Utah 26, 134 Pac. 553, 
557, the court stated: 
"The Sup.reme Court of California, in a very 
recent case, in passing upon the question of what 
constitutes undue influence, and in holding that 
in that case there was no evidence of undue in-
fluence, said: 'In the face of this showing, which 
we have set forth in mere outline, there is no 
basis for the claim that the will was procured to 
be made hy the undue influence of the proponent. 
'Undue influence, however used, must, in order 
to avoid a will, destroy the free agency of the 
testator at the time, and in the very act of the 
1naking of the testament. It must bear directly 
up·on the testamentary act." 
* .;;: * 
''***The Supreme Court of Kansas in a very 
recent case (Ginter v. Ginter, 79 l{an. 721, 101 
Pac. 634, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 102±) lays down the 
rule in these words : 'To vitiate a will there must 
be more than influence. It must be undue influ-
ence. To be classed as 'undue' influence it must 
place the testator in the attitude of saying, 'It 
is not n2y will, but I must do it.' He 1nust act 
under su.ch coercion, conz.pulsion, or constraint 
that his own free agency is destroyed. The will 
or the provision assailed does not truly proceed 
fron't him. He becomes the tutored instrument 
of a dominant mind, 'vhich dictates to him \rhat 
he shall do, co1npels hin1 to adopt its will instead 
of exercising his own, and by overcoming his 
power of resistance impels him to do "That he 
would not have done had he been free from its 
control.' " 
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Also to the effect that undue influence in order to 
vitiate a willrnust have been exerted at the very tirne and 
in the very act of execu.ting the will. In re Bryan's 
E::;tate, supra; In re La.velle's Estate, 248 P. 2d 372; In 
re Lincoln's Esta.te, supra. 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment 
The trial court has made Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law that Gail was dominated by undue 
influence on the three occasions spanning a period of 
four years, vvhen she executed her will and the two codi-
cils thereto. It shall be our purpose to consider every find-
ing which bears upon the subject of undue influence in 
the light of the evidence. 
The trial court found that Gail did not have inde-
pendent advice at the times of executing her will and 
codicils, and has attached much significance to this so-
called fact in its memorandum decision (Findings No. 
18, 20, 23; Conclusions No.2, 4, 6, 7). 
The will was executed in the presence of Macfar-
lane's secretary, Patricia Pike, and a stranger, Vivian 
W eggeland. The first codicil was executed in the pre-
sence of Patricia Pike Stewart and a lawyer, Irwin 
Clawson. Although Clawson, not an associate of Mac-
farlane's, had been an acquaintance of Gail for sorne 
time, a finding is no doubt justified that on the two occa-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
92 
sions aforesaid Gail had no independent advice, although 
there is no evidence as to whether prior to executing 
these two documents she had independent advice. 
The circumstances surrounding execution of the 
second codicil were somewhat different. 
Dr. Neilsen and Dr. Darke are professional men of 
high repute. Neither was shown to have any relation-
ship with Macfarlane, or the other beneficieries which 
would in any wa.y imp·each their credibility. They dis-
cussed the will with Gail in private shortly before its 
execution. They questioned her specifically as to 
v;hether she desired to leave her property to the benefi-
ciaries mentioned in the codicil, and whether she was 
acting under "p:ressu.re or force" from anyone (R. 806, 
807). Such questioning was tantamount to advice to 
Gail that if she was under pressure or force she needn't 
execute the codicil. Her response was that she wanted 
to execute it. 
As heretofore mentioned, four years elapsed be-
tween execution of the will and the second codicil. A 
different set of witnesses affixed their signatures to 
each instrument. Five years elap·sed between the \vill 
and Gail's death. Over this period of time she had many 
op~portunities for change of heart, many op.portunities 
for successful rebellion against any influence that may 
have been exerted up.on her. But she ren1ained stead-
fast in her purpose to remember her friends substan-
tially in her will. 
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During this five year period, Gail mingled freely 
with friends and relatives alike. She was never isolated 
but was a free agent to the last. She had an abundance 
of opportunity for independent advice from her various 
housekeepers, doctors, friends, and relatives. Certainly 
it.cannut be coniended that t:lfailure to seek and follow 
G. • 1,1nwanted advice invalidates her will. When Theo asked a11 about her will 2 montbs hifor~ her dP-ath. 
responnea, .t na.ve maae a w11I / ~ .tC ~~). l'lns clear1y ·· 
indicates she did not need nor want any advice. It is 
likewise indicative of the fact that she was not acting 
under undue influence. 
In re Lavelle's Estate, supra, the court stated: 
'She was at no time isolated from her rela-
tives or friends who had a legitimate interest in 
visiting her." 
.A .. nd again : 
"There is another aspect of the case which 
is strongly persuasive that this third testament 
represented the will of Lucille LaveUe: It is indis-
putable that after its execution she lived for a 
year: about six months in Ogden and about six 
months in the Holladay rest home; during this 
time she had communication with others but made 
no effort to revoke the will or to make another." 
In 123 A.L.R.. 1505, the annotator discusses the 
subject of independ~nt advice and states at page 1513 : 
"In the nature of things, the cases which may 
be relied upon as authority against the rule of in-
dependent advice are sounder direct authority 
Gall 
~ 
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than those conn11only relied up~on as supporting 
the rule. For if a court upholds a transaction in 
the absence of independent advice, and in so doing 
declines to follow the suggested rule, it is clear 
that there has been an actual decision against the 
rule; while if a court overthrows a transaction 
where independent' advice was not had it 1nay us-
ually be well argued that, in the circurnstances ap-
p·earing, the presumption of unfairness and undue 
influence was not in any manner rebutted, and 
hence that language of the court in support of 
the rule amounted to no more than an obiter de-
claration to the effect that had independent advice 
been obtained, the transaction might have been up-
held. PEYTON v. WILLIAM C. PEYTON CORP. 
(Del.) (reported herewith) ante, 1482, is, itself, a 
decision of that character." 
And again at page 1515 : 
"Under the authorities generally, the real in-
quiry in such cases as are here under considera-
tion is whether confidence was abused, or the 
transaction fair and free from the undue influ-
ence which, prima facie, is to be inferred from the 
relationship·. The existence or nonexistence of in-
dep~endent advice in the transaction is, according 
to the p·revailing view, merely evidence bearing 
upon those questions." 
We have discovered no will contest case which re-
quires that where a confidential relationship exists the 
maker of a will must at his or her peril seek independent 
advice, or that either directly or inferentially holds that 
lack of independent advice is anything 1nore than a cir-
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cumstance to be considered in its relationship with other 
circun1stances. Certainly it cannot be contended that 
lack of independent advice takes the place of evidence 
of undue influence. 
It is significant that with changing circun1stances 
the friends Gail remembered in her will changed. Fors-
berg's death brought about a change. Increased reliance 
on Kostopulos brought about another change. Her grow-
ing friendship with the Bridges brought about still an-
other and her 1nellowing attitude toward Theo still an-
other. Her affection, gratitude, and later sympathy for 
~Iaefar lane \Yere reflected direetly in her will and codi-
cils. 
The trial court has found that Macfarlane and Ko-
stopulos \Vere doubtful of Gail's mental capacity to make 
a testamentary disposition of her property, and that as 
a result '"instead of having office help attest the second 
codicil, Macfarlane made an appointment with a doctor, 
who was a total stranger to Gail Swan, and entirely 
unacquainted with her illness. He arranged to have an 
examination made by Dr. Neilsen" (Finding No. 23). 
~[acfarlane testified that Gail wanted to be examined 
(R. 730). No contrary testimony appears in the record. 
There is extrinsic evidenee to support his credibili~ty in 
this regard. After Gail's grandfather, Edward D. Swan, 
died, a granddaughter contested the will on the ground 
of lack of testamentary capacity and on the further 
ground ~that Gail's father, the principal beneficiary, had 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
96 
exerted undue influence on her grandfather. This litiga-
tion was unquestionably discussed many tin1es in the 
Swan household (R. 138). Theo was financially secure. 
For this reason as vvell as others, Gail did not want Theo 
to receive all of her estate. Furthermore, Gail knew ~rheo 
was mercenary. She was forced to caution ~1ortenson and 
Macfarlane to refuse to impart further information about 
her business to Theo ( R .. 4 78, 726). Is it so incredible that 
Gail would want to be examined when she made her last 
will~ 
If Macfarlane and Kostopulos were in doubt as to 
Gail's mental capacity to make a will, were p:racticing 
undue influence upon her, would they hazard an examin-
ation by two medical doctors, one of whom was a psy-
chiatrist with whom they were not even acquainted~ On 
the contrary, the fact Macfarlane was willing to have 
Gail submit to a physical and mental examination demon-
strates his utter frankness. 
The true significance of the doctors' examinations 
of Gail lies in their firsthand professional opinions as 
to her menta:l condition as of the very tim.e the codicil was 
executed, that Gail was well oriented with respect to her 
friends, relatives and acquaintances; that she had the 
mental ability to know and did know, and could readily 
call to mind her various properties, that she had the 
ability to and did have an intelligent plan for disposition 
of her property, that she was at ease, that she was not 
subject to force or pressure from any source, and that she 
sincerely desired to do what she 'vas doing with her prop-
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erty under the tern1s of the will. This fits perfectly 
\vith Dr. Frank's card for April 23, 1951, the date the 
second codicil was executed, which records that Gail 
was examined on that date and was ''feeling fine." (Ex. 
19). The weight and significance of Dr. Darke's testimony 
is even more apparent \vhen viewed in the light of the fact 
that he was called in by another doctor rather than by 
anyone interested in the will (R. 804). 
66 Harv. L. Rev. 1116, 1118, contains an article on 
the subject of psychiatric assistance in the determination 
of testamentary capacity. Among other things the an-
notator states : 
"The Psychiatrist in Court. - The difficul-
ties encountered by experts in will contest cases 
often reflect the failure to use psychiatrists at the 
will-drawing stage. In most cases the psychiatrist 
must give his opinion of the testator's capacity 
without the benefit of a psychiatric examination 
at the time the will was executed. He must base 
his conclusions on testimony by laymen as to their 
observations of the testator-observations made at 
a time when the lay witnesses were not thinking 
in terms of testamentary capacity. Moreover, 
these observers are often partisan in their views. 
Clearly, a personal examination would have given 
the psychiatrist a much firmer basis for his opin-
ion." 
The trial court has stated at page 4 of its memo-
randum decision, ''Dr. Neilsen made a physical examina-
tion, and in that brief time he discovered that Miss Swan 
\vas a case for a psychiatrist. Dr. Neilsen then called Dr. 
Darke, a psychiatrist." This statement is merely indica-
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tive of the many n1isconceptions of evidence on the part 
of the trial court. Dr. Neilsen had n1ade arrangements 
for Dr. Darke to examine Gail two or three days prior 
to his examination of her and before he had even made 
her acquaintance. He requested Dr. Darke to examine her 
because of the obvious fact that a psychiatrist rather than 
a physical problem was involved (R. 804, 840). 
The trial court has indicated that Kostopulos and 
~Iacfarlane were working in collusion where it finds "At 
the time of Gail's death the amounts still on deposit in 
the names of Macfarlane and Kostopulos \Vere exactly 
the same-$4,597.17 each." And again at the time of ex-
ecuting the firs't and second codicils she was "under the 
influence and domination of 1facfarlane and Kostopulos" 
(Findings 21, 32). 
The evidence 1s that Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
were not even acquainted when the first codicil was pre-
pared; that the first time they met was during ~1r. s.wan'~ 
last illness in June of 1950, and that they had only seen 
each other on two or three occasions since that time (R .. 
757, 758). 
There is no evidence that Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
ever discussed Gail's will or codicils, or planned any-
thing with respect to their contents. It is highly unlikely 
that Macfarlane would practice undue influence on Gail 
in behalf of Kostopulos. It is also unlikely that Macfar-
lane would pTactice undue influence up.on Gail in behalf 
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of the Bridges, and certainly not in behalf of Theo. If 
he had such a firn1 grip upon Gail and were as avaricious 
and grasping as clairned, he could very readily have dealt 
l(ostopulos, the Bridges, and Theo completely out of 
the picture. Yet he wrote the second codicil withdrawing 
hi.Jnself as beneficiary of 1335 Perry Avenue and 234 
South 2nd East Street, property having a total assessed 
value of $24,500.00, and making Thea arnd Ada Bridge 
the respective beneficiaries. 
Gail expressed the desire to treat Macfarlane and 
l(ostopulos substantially alike at the time she created the 
joint bank accounts (R. 158). Her consistency of purpose 
in this regard is den1onstrated by the fact that her later 
gifts of stocks and bonds to Macfarlane and Kostopulos 
\Vere in substantially the same amounts (R. 753, 754). 
This purpose is also reflected in the second codicil in 
\vhich ~1acfarlane and Kostopu'los are left substantially 
the san1e amounts. These transactions reflected Gail's ex-
pressed desires. Any other conclusion requires utter dis-
regard of evidence and resort to pure guesswork. 
The trial court 1uade a Finding of F·act that in April 
of 1950, "~Iacfarlane prepared and caused Gail Swan to 
sign and deliver to hi1n a full and general power of at-
torney 1naking hiin her attorney-in-fact." (Finding No. 
21). 
The foregoing finding contains a suggestion that the 
po\ver of attorney \Yas ~1acfarlane's idea, and not Gail's 
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and that somehow this power of attorney was misused 
by Macfarlane to Gail's prejudice. The only evidence 
concerning the matter was Macfarlane's own testimony 
that Gail asked him to prepare the power of attorney 
so that if she needed any money or any instru1nents sign-
ed or anything done in her name he could do these things 
for her (R,. 246, 723). According to Dr. Frank, Gail's 
general health was on the decline (R. 45,5, 456). She was 
hosp~italized wi1thin a month after executing the power of 
attorney, and on four additional occasions thereafter 
(R. 735). The power of attorney was a natural develop-
lnent stemming from her physical decline. 
l\{acfarlane's own testimony was also the only evi-
dence as to the use to which the power of attorney was 
p~ut. He first testified to setting up the three joint ac-
counts at Gail's request (R. 158, 231). Theo apparently 
found no fault with the joint account with herself and 
husband. Neither Macfarlane nor Kostopulos made so 
1nuch as one withdrawal from these accounts. Gail n1ade 
several withdrawals from the Macfarlane and Kostopu-
los accounts and eventually took the Hendee book back 
from Macfarlane and used 1nost of the proceeds from it 
(R. 248, 724, 725). It is significant, however, that on one 
occasion Ma1cfarlane actually placed $1,000 in the Hendee 
accownt a,t Gail's request. The formation and handling of 
the accounts firts perfectly with Gail's general pattern of 
purp,ose (R. 158, 231-233, 247-249, 7'23-725). 
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The trial court found that nfacfarlane accepted 80 
shares of Westinghouse Electric Company stock valued 
at $3,000 and $1,500 par value U. S. Government Bonds, 
and that he allowed Gail to deliver to l{ostopulos 100 
shares of Utah Power & Light Company stock valued at 
$3,000 and $1,500 par value U. S. Governrnent bonds, and 
that the acceptance of the foregoing stocks and bonds 
was "entirely without consideration and was in further-
ance of their design and purpose to abuse their confiden-
tial relationship with Gail Swan." Macfarlane used the 
power of attorney in connection with these transactions 
(Finding No. 22). 
Again, the sole and only testirnony was that of Mac-
farlane and Kostopulos. They testified that the gifts 
were Gail's idea, were freely and voluntarily made, were 
rnotivated by her avowed affection for them and appreci-
ation for their services (R. 236-239, 325, 326, 345). 
The trial court has inferentially conceded the In-
adequacy of this evidence as evidence of undue influence 
'Where it makes no finding that Gail lacked understanding 
of these transactions, makes no finding that the gifts 
were not freely and voluntarily made, or that they did 
not refle0t her desire. That she knew the significance of 
her act in making the gifts is indicated by the fact that 
she procured and delivered the war bonds in person (R·. 
239, 345) o She also made personal delivery of the stock 
certificates (R. 236, 237, 325, 326). She at no time indi-
cated a change of purpose with respect to these gifts. 
(R. 644, 645). 
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Gail de1nonstrated 1nany tin1es during her lifetilne 
a general purpose of returning gifts and consideration · 
in her will for the kindness and services of her friends. 
. She was deeply appreciative qf Jack Forsberg's 
helpfulness and kindness to her and Mr. Swan over the 
years. He had helped with the upkeep and manage1nent 
of the Swan proper~ties. She attempted to loan hi1n $3,-
000.00 at a time when he was in need (R. 273-275). She 
made him a beneificiary in her will. The cancellation of 
Mr. Bridge's indebtedness fits the same p·attern of pur-
pose (R. 644, 645). The foregoing transactions were en-
tirely independent of each other. Likewise, they had no 
relationship with her gifts to Macfarlane and Kostopulos. 
J?t jfi elear i11at gaij -1uuJ Q }.}lind a:ro] lJtii@Gdlt t '~ 
-eoB:Stant to rQvTaF·d=her el€HHs friemls fQF theit l~Bel!lses 
~ttr:rrvi res, fletL }a g. fl a od tleviee. 
In re La.v-elle's Estate, supra, the court states: 
"* * * She gave him sun1s of money, so1ne 
rather large, and iteins of personal property dur-
ing her lifetime. Respondents urge that this sup-
p~orts their contention of undue influence; but to 
the contrary, the fact that they were given, and 
over a considerable p·eriod of time, is strong indi-
cation of the constancy of her affection and regard 
for him and corroborates the idea that she 'vanted 
to 1nake pTovision for him in her will." 
Furthermore, making the gifts and setting up the 
savings accounts in no w-ay impoverished Gail. At the 
time of her death she had a savings account at Tracy-
Collins Trust Co1npany in her o'vn nan1e in the arnount 
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of $5,867.23. She was receiving a.pproxin1ately $1,500 per 
month gross income from her properties, with a net in-
come of approximately $1,000 per 1nonth. Her gross es-
tate was 1n e~cess of $300,000.00 (Probate File No. 
34571). 
The 1naking of the gifts is strongly persuasive evi-
dence that Gail genuinely desired to 1nake Macfarlane, 
Kostopulos a.nd the Bridges beneficiaries in her will. 
~facfarlane used the power of attorney in signing a 
lease previously agreed upon by Gail \vith Tandy Leather 
Company. On another occasion, at Gail's request, he ob-
tained signature cards on a prospective joint account 
\vith the Bridges, and sent the cards to the Union Trust 
Company (R.234, 235). 
The foregoing evidence covers the uses to which the 
power of attorney was put. From this evidence it is clear 
that l\facfar lane on no occasion used the power of at-
torney except at Gail's request, and on no occasion trans-
cended her specific verbal authority. 
The trial court found that Kostopulos ''endeavored 
to plant in the mind of Gail that her sister was hostile to 
her. He was informed in advance from time to time when 
Gail's sister was planning a visit from California, and on 
such occasions he suggested to Dr. En1ory F~rank, * * * 
that Gail should be 'doped up' in advance- of her siste-r's 
visits." (Finding No. 15). 
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There was no evidence whatsoever that Kostopulos 
ever endeavored to bring about a breach between Gail and 
Theo. 
Dr. Frank's testimony was (R .. 462) : 
"Dan told me tha:t Gail always got upset when 
Theo would come, and wanted me to be sure and 
give her a larger dose of medicine to dope her up 
or quiet her down, so that she'd be sure and be 
very quiet while her sister was here." 
He also testified that Gail was present when two such 
conversations occurred (R. 464). 
The evidence is that Gail did get upset when Theo 
was in town. When Theo returned from her latest trip to 
Europe they had a misunderstanding (R. 132). They had 
unpleasantness on another occasion when Theo asked 
what Gail had gotten out of her old stove (R. 131, 132, 
167). Gail was upset when Theo sent cast off clothing 
to her (R .. 699, 700). Gail likewise became upset when she 
learned that Theo was prying into her business (R. 478, 
726). 
Any up~setting factors caused Gail to suffer ill ef-
fects. The difficulty with Mrs. F'olden became a matter 
of great concern to Dr. Frank (R. 4·50, 451, 533). Her 
concern over 1Iacfarlane's eye operation caused her to 
suffer a severe epileptic seizure (R. 432). 
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The advice Kostopulos gave to Dr. Frank concerning 
Gail was certainly for her best interest. Yet the trial 
court has taken the words "doped up" out of context and 
given them an unnatural and unjustified meaning. 
The trial court has found that Kostopulos' "constant 
and persistent attention to Gail and her father was un-
natural * * * was rnotivated by a desire· to gain the con-
fidence and trust of Gail and her father in the hopes of 
financial reward,'' and that Kostopulos "pretended to be 
her most obedient friend, for the purpose of cementing 
and securing a confidential relationship to the end that 
he might profit from his dominating position." That' 'the 
persistent attentions of the Bridges to Gail Swan was 
motivated by a desire to gain her trust and confidence 
in the hope of profiting from such show of kindness," and 
that "Macfarlane employed the difficulty with his eyes 
to play upon the syrnpathy and emotions of his client," 
and that Kostopulos and 1\'Iacfarlane w·ere "serious rivals 
for Gail's generosity." (Findings No. 15, 16, 17). The 
rnotivation which impelled Niacfarlane, Kostopulos and 
the Bridges to perforn1 their countless acts of kindness 
to-vvard Gail is of relatively insignificant importance. 
The question is whether Gail genuinely desired these 
friends to participate as beneficiaries in her will. 
We call attention to the language In re George's Es-
tate, supra, where the court stated: 
"* * * It makes little difference how hard 
Weldow labored to accomplish the undue influ-
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ence attributable to his desires, if as a Inatter 
of fact the father was 'villing that he and Eliza-
beth have the p·roperty." 
See also In re Lavelle's Estate, supra, where it is 
said: 
"Where the affection and desire of a testatrix 
is genuine, it matters not that the illicit relation-
ship n1ay have played a part in inducing it." 
S-ee also In re Ford's Estate, supTa. 
Gail's reasons for making the proponents benefici-
aries were her own affair, so long as the will was her 
own and not that of some overpowering and unduly in-
fluencing person. F'or example, if she felt that she needed 
the kindnesses and services of Macfarlane, Kostopulos 
and the Bridges and that her opportunities for a continu-
ance of these kindnesses and services were enhanced by 
n1aking the1n beneficiaries in her will, it was her privilege 
to 1nake them beneficiaries. It was her p~rivilege to have 
actually contracted for these services and kindnesses 
with bequests in her will as the consideration if such had 
been her desire. See In re Goldsberry's E sta.te, 95 lT tah 
379, 81 P. 2d 1106, where the court said: 
"She appeared rath·er to be a robust-n1inded 
person who wanted something and \villing to pay 
the p~rice to get it." 
Gail's needs and demands upon her friends \Yere consider-
able. 
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The following language from In re Lavelle's Estate., 
supra, is particularly appropriate here: 
"To declare a w·ill invalid upon the showing 
mad.e in this case would unduly limit the right of 
a co1npetent but bedfast person, ill and in dire 
need of help, to leave her property to the indi-
vid~tals who serve her in the extremity of need. 
The testatrix shou.Zd not be prevented from devis-
ing her property according to her own wishes 
merely because an opportunity for undue influ-
ence exists; nor should the benficiaries be depriv-
ed of their devise because such opportunity arose 
through their service to and associ.ation with her/' 
The trial court also made Finding-s of Fact that at 
the time the will of l\fay 2, 1947 was signed Gail's "men-
tality was too weak to withstand the effect of such in-
fluence; that she therefore lacked testamenary capacity 
to make the will.'' And further, that when the first codi-
cil was signed on February 20, 1950 Gail "did not have 
the mental capacity to make a testamentary disposition 
of her property because her childish and immature mind 
was unable to resist, and could not resist, the domina-
tion and influence of Mac far lane;" that when the second 
codicil was signed on April 23, 1951, Gail ''was under the 
influence and dornination of l\Iacfarlane and Kostopulos 
and did not have the rnental capacity to make a testa-
Inentary disposition of her property." 
The court further found that ''under the c1rcu1n-
stances and in the setting surrounding the signing of the 
\vill and the tvvo codicils under attack in these proceed-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
108 
ings, she was unable to give any free and independent 
exercise to what mentality she had and was, therefore, 
1nentally incompetent and lacked testamentary capacity 
to execute and make a valid testamentary disposition 
of her p,rop:erty at the time she signed the purported 
will and each of the codicils." 
Let us consider for a moment whether Gail's will re-
sulted from overpowering or from her genuine affection 
for Macfarlane and Kostopulos. Mrs. Martsolf testified 
that Gail was strong-minded and could not be easily 
talked out of things (R. 302, 303). She further testified 
that Gail was rebellious against the strong restraint 
that had been imposed upon her by her father; that she 
wanted to dispos,e of her money in her own way (R. 282, 
283). Mortensen testified that she had a mind of her own 
(R. 476-478). Gail discharged one lawyer, Snyder, and 
withdrew her documents from his office after he had 
done .work for her over a considerable period of time in 
order to hire Macfarlane (R. 188, 189). She discharged 
Tracy-Collins even though she had been a friend of Kipp 
for many years, after a misunderstanding over placing 
certain moneys in her personal account (R. 159). When 
she didn't think pr. Cowan and Dr. Pace were helping 
her she changed to Dr. F'rank (R. 423, 424). Gail dis-
charged Mrs. Folden when she insinuated that Gail had 
taken some theater tickets from 1frs. Folden's purse 
(R. 438, 450-453, 53'2, 533). When Gail hecrune dissatis-
fied with her newly installed kitchen equipment she in-
sisted, at the inconvenience of everyone concerned that it 
' 
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be detached and returned ( R. 698, 699'). Further indica-
tion of Gail's strength of mind was. her firm instruction 
to Mortensen not to let Theo know anything about he-r 
business, and her statement to Macfarlane that if he 
discussed her affairs with Theo again he would get his 
walking papers, and also her refusal to discuss the con-
tents of her will with Theo two months before her death 
(R. 128, 488, 726). While Gail was receptive to acts of 
kindness and friendship, she \Vas not receptive to opposi-
tion or efforts to unduly influence her life. 'She resented 
any effort to interfere with her free will. She certainly 
did not have such a weak and vacillating cha.racter as to 
be undttly influenced over a period of five years by any 
person or persons. Gail made Macfarlane and Kostopu-
los beneficiaries from desire, not from fear or force. 
As indicative of the length to which the trial court 
\vas willing to go, consider the finding that "neither Ada 
Bridge nor her husband, Joseph La1nar Bridge, partici-
pated in the preparation of the will or either of the codi-
cils, but the court finds that the bequest of Ada Bridge 
was the result of undue influence exercised upon Gail 
Swan by Ada and Joseph Lamar Bridge, who occupied 
a confidential relationship with Gail." (Finding No. 28). 
Even though the Bridges had no knowledge of Gail's 
plan of devise, no knowledge that the will and codicils 
existed, weren't physically present \vhen the docun1ents 
were prepared or executed, had no relationship \Vith nfac-
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farlane nevertheless the trial court \Yas \villing to follo'v 
' counsel for contestant and 1nake a finding of undue in-
fluence. 
The term "confidential relationship" has been given 
n1uch attention by the trial court. Any person for who1n 
another has a genuine feeling of affection and adinira-
tion, is ·a confidant, the degree of confidence depending on 
the individual circumstanees. The usual and natural 
thing is for a confidant to be the one upon who1n an-
other's bounty is bestowed. Here Gail had a genuine and 
sincere affection for Macfarlane, Kostopulos, and the 
Bridges. She was deeply appreciative of their many kind-
nesses. Also, she had a genuine feeling of sympathy for 
Macfarlane and the Bridges. There is no contrary evi-
denee. Theo, Aunt Bell, Grace Flolden, Dr. and l\T rs. 
Frank, the chief witnesses for contestant, all conceded 
these facts. And affection, gratitude and sympathy are 
the strongest and most impelling motives for 1naking a 
devise. The trial court has in effect ·conceded that such 
were Gail's Inotives where it finds that Gail "was un-
usually susceptible to any show of friendship," "that 
difficulty brought on unusual sympathy from Gail" "the 
confidential nature of their relationship had been Ina de 
stronger a.s the years went by,'' "the co1nplete confidence 
and trust she put in them" (Findings 8, 17, 23, 32). If 
such were Gail's n1otives, can it be said that she vvas un-
duly influenced~ The cause of Gail's affection for these 
people was their 1nany acts of kindness, their 1nany serv-
ices, their consideration. The cause of her sympathy for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
111 
the Bridges was their unfortunate financial circum-
stances, and for Macfarlane his series of personal mis-
fortunes. Gail's reaction was the natural reaction of a 
loyal and grateful friend. Who can deny these truths~ 
The trial court has cynically mistaken kindness and gen-
erosity on the proponents' part for greed, affection for 
n1alice, and sincerity for deception. It has mistaken grati-
tude and sympathy on Gail's part for fear and weakness, 
and has thereby perpetrated an unthinkable injustice. 
It completely ignores the word "undue" in the phrase 
undue influence. 
Authorities 
In re La.velle' s Estate, supra. ~Irs. Lucille Lavelle, 
a widow having no children, died leaving three testa-
Inentary instru1nents, each of which revoked any for-
rner wills. The first left half of her property to her hus-
band, and the other half to her half-sister, Kathleen 
Miller. The second, following her husband's death, left 
the greater part of her estate to a cousin, and made 
several bequests to relatives and friends and expressly 
disinherited her half-sister, Kathleen ::\filler. The third, 
and last of the wills, noted an intentional ornission of all 
her relatives or any other possible heirs and gave the 
estate to her "very good friend and benefactor Eric W. 
Immerthal" and her "devoted friend and benefactor 
nionte G. Hogg." 
The lower court admitted the second will to pro bate, 
rejecting the third on the ground that it had been induced 
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by the undue influence of ·Im1nerthal and Hogg. The ap-
p€al challenged sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
court's finding of undue influence. It appeared that front 
May of 1947 until her death in July of 1950, Mrs. Lavelle 
was a bedridden invalid, p~aralyzed on her left side and 
suffering from certain kidney and urinary disorders. 
Her closest relatives lived out of the state; so, except 
for the first six weeks after the onset of her illness, "\vhen 
her half-sister, Kathleen Miller, was with her, she had 
to be cared for entirely by hired personnel. Though Mrs. 
Miller was legal guardian of the invalid from August, 
1947 to May, 1948, the responsibility of seeing to the 
decedent's wants developed largely upon Immerthal, a 
succession of over twenty housekeepers and nurses, and 
W. H. Loos, trust officer for the First Security Bank of 
Utah, who for a time administered a trust for Mrs. La-
velle and later became guardian of her estate. 
Imrnerthal was a rnale nurse and masseur, who visit-
ed Mrs. Lavelle aln1ost daily in the course of his profes-
sional responsibiliti~s. With the passage of time he took 
n1ore and more interest in her welfare. He helped find 
rep1acements for the nurses and housekeep·ers and it was 
from this association and service to the testatrix that the 
supposed undue influence resulted. 
Hogg was employed by Mrs. Lavelle a.s her carpenter 
to transform part of her ho1ne into rental rooms. Later 
he 1noved into the home, forming with her an attachment 
see1ningly of great warmth, and as the court found, sus-
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tained an illicit relationship·. Concerning this particular 
evidence the court stated: 
"Conceding the impropriety of their intimacy 
and also remembering that the motives of a man 
who formed such a liason with a partially paral-
yzed woman older than himself (she was almost 
60, he in his early 50's) certainly would be suspect, 
yet those circumstances alone, which in the main 
form the basis of the respondents' case as to Hogg, 
do not support a finding of undue influence with 
respect to the making of the will." 
The court then considered the evidence concerning 
undue influence on the part of Immerthal. 
"As to Immerthal, there also is no direct evi-
dence of undue influence. It is true that he inter-
ested himself in the management of Mrs. Lavelle's 
personal affairs (in January of 1950, after the 
execution of the third will, he became guardian of 
her person). In view of the fact that none of her 
relatives manifested such interest, this seems to 
have been a fortunate circumstance for her wel-
fare. He helped to arrange for her care when 
she stayed at home, by artifice managed to get 
around her resistance to entering the hospital and 
used similar means to get her into a rest home 
about six months prior to her death. The desira-
bility and necessity for her to be so hospitalized 
and later placed in a rest home was corroborated 
by others. To Immerthal 's credit, it must be said 
that there is independent evidence that on one 
occasion Mrs. Lavelle told him that if he would 
care for her until her death, he could have the 
property; he refused this offer. 
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"The strongest single circumstance respond-
ents have to rely on concerning undue influence 
is evidence that visitors were discouraged fro1n 
seeing decedent and that 'No visitors' signs were 
placed on her house and on the hospital room dur-
ing her illness. There is no evidence and no find-
ing that Hogg was connected with this activity and 
the evidence concerning Immerthal in this regard 
is very limited. It is not shown that he affixed 
the signs. There is evidence that at least some 
of them were displayed with the approval of the 
attending p~hysician and that the sign a.t the hos-
pital during the time the third will was executed 
was put up on the doctor's authorization. On one 
occasion when Mrs. Lavelle was alone in her house 
for a few days just before Christmas of '49, In1-
merthal told a neighbor lady that he was trying 
to get her to go to the hospital and that 'If you 
ladies and neighbors won't come in and interfere, 
I'll be able to get her to the hospital much sooner, 
but if you keep interfering it will take n1e longer.' 
Although there is some dispute in the evidence 
concerning this matter, it is sufficient so the 
trial court could properly find, as it did, that Im-
Inerthal had discouraged visitors from seeing 
Mrs. Lavelle. His conduct is explainable as being 
the means of getting the recalcitrant lady into the 
hospital and of preventing information of her 
whereabouts from being learned by Hogg. She 
was at no ti1ne isolated front her relatives or 
friends u;ho ha.d a legitimate interest in visiting 
her. 
* * * 
"The directions first given with respect to the 
third will did not include Immerthal as a bene-
ficiary. As he app·arently neither liked nor ap-
p·roved of Hogg, it is unlikely that he had ex-
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erted any undue influence upon decedent in 
Hogg's behalf. To get Mrs. Lavelle to include 
him as a part beneficiary, it would seem that 
Innnerthal would have had to exercise at least 
so1ne influence during the one-day period between 
the lawyer's first and second visits with her. There 
is no evidence of any such occurrence. 
"We are aware that ' * * * undue influence 
is seldom subject to direct proof, but, as a gen-
eral rule, must be established by inferences and 
circumstances * * *'; but it must also be kept in 
mind that '* * * it likewise is true that a finding 
of undue influence cannot rest upon mere suspi-
cion. There must be some substantial facts upon 
which the inferences and deductions are based, 
and the circumstances relied on should clearly 
point out the person who it is alleged exercised 
the undue influen'ce and his acts constit111ting the 
alleged undue influence.' 
* * * 
"* * * The mere fact that testatrix preferred 
in her will those who were close to her, rendering 
her assistance, and ministering to her physical 
and emotional needs, to the exclusion of her rela-
tives, who did not give her that care and attention, 
does not present an instance of unnatural dispo-
sition." 
The court, in holding as a matter of law that there 
\vas insufficient evidence to support a finding of undue 
influence, stated as follows: 
"To declare a will invalid tt]JOn the showinp 
rnade in this case would und,uly lim,it the right of 
a competent but bedfast person, ill a,nd in dire 
need of help, to leave her property to the individu-
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als who serve her in the extremity of need. The 
testatrix should not be pvrevevYI)ted; from devising 
her p·rop·erty accordVn.g to her own wishes merely 
becaUAse 01n opportunity for und·ue influence exists; 
nor should the beneficiaries be dep·rived of their 
devise because such opportwnity ~arose through 
their service to and ·association wit.h her. 
"Viewing the eviden'Ce and every fair infer-
ence therefrom most favorably to the finding of 
the trial court, we cannot find it sufficient to sup-
port the conclusion reached that the third and last 
will was induced by undue influence. The cause 
is remanded to the District Court for the purpose 
of having that instrument probatHd as the last 
will and testament of Lucille Lavelle." 
A1~derson v. Anderson, sup·ra, was an action to set 
aside the probate of a will on the ground of undue influ-
ence. Testator was married and had one 1ninor child. He 
also had two brothers, Heber and John Anderson. The 
testator and his brothers each owned a one-third interest 
in a ranch in Idaho. Testator also had a small estate, con-
sisting of money and personalty. While testator was in 
the hospital with uremic p·oison and extremely ill, his 
brother, Heber, came to s·alt Lake and visited hin1 at St. 
Mark's Hospital. Thereafter, Heber arranged for a 1fr. 
~iarks, an attorney, to prepare a will. He also procured a 
1nernoranda or notes from testator as to how he desired 
the property to be distributed, and took it to Marks. 
Marks prepared a rough draft of a will which Heber took 
back to testator at the hospital and thereafter testator 
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1nade son1e small changes. 1farks then prepared the \viii 
in final forrn and testator signed and two witnesses duly 
attested the will. 
An operation was performed on testator two weeks 
later. He i1nproved in health for a short period of time, 
returned to the hospital and died. The will left testator's 
share of the ranch to his two brothers. They were also 
1nade residuary legatees. He gave his wife one-third of 
his remaining p~roperty, after pay1nent of all debts, and 
his infant son a total of $5000. Testator had been 'in ill 
health for a number of years before his death and his 
brothers had operated the ranch. The court, in holding 
as a matter of law that there was no undue influence ex-
erted and in reversing a jury's finding of undue influence, 
stated: 
"We have atte1npted to set forth with as n1uch 
particularity as is pos·sible within the limits of 
an opinion all the salient facts that were produced 
in evidence by the petitioners against the will. 
Is there anything in what we have set forth that 
can be dignified by the narne of evidence which 
in any way tends to show undue influence prac-
ticed upon the decedent, or fro1n which it n1ay 
legitimately be inferred that he was influenced 
to make any kind of a will by any one1 Is it not 
beyond all peradventure of a doubt that whatever 
infeTences are permissible from Reher's acts and 
conduct are just as likely to have emanated fron1 
pure brotherly motives to assist Paul as frorn Ino-
tives bent upon influencing him in the disposition 
of his p~roperty in accordance with Heber's will1 
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One is almost shocked by the assertion that the 
kindly offices of one brother to another, \vhen the 
httter is in distress, may, without any tangible 
facts, be contorted into evidence showing sinister 
motives. If wills can be set aside hy courts upon 
the ground of undue influence upon p·roof such as 
is presented in this case, then any will may be 
assailed in any case where the decedent was sick 
for any length of time, and was so situated that his 
immediate relatives were concerned in his welfare 
and made any attempts whatever to alleviate his 
suffering or to comply with his expressed wishes 
or requests. What is said that Heber did, or what 
is inferred he did, as shown by this record, cannot 
be tortured into evidence supporting the charge 
that he p·racticed undue influence upon Paul. 
* * * 
"~~ * * 'To vitiate a will there must be more 
than influence. It must be undue influence. To be 
classed as 'undue' influence it must place the 
testator in the attitude of saying, 'It is not my 
w·ill, but I must do it.' He must act under such 
coercion, compulsion, or constraint that his own 
free aqency is destroye:d. The will or the provi-
sion assaile:d does not truly proceed fran~ him. 
* * * 
"* * * The judgment of the jury may be 
sounder and wiser than that of the father, hut that 
is no reason whatever for substituting the judg-
ment of the former for that of the latter. The la\r 
of this state gives 'every person over the age of 
eighteen years, of sound mind,' the right to dis-
pose of his property by wi11 as to him seems just 
and right. If this right may be invaded simply 
because a court or jury 1nay not be able to agree 
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'vith the testator in the n1anner he has disposed 
of his property, or be·cause he has not made an 
adequate allowance for a speeific purjose, then 
the right had better be abrogated entirely. The 
Legislature might do so, but courts eannot. We 
can discover no legal reason whatever for sustain-
ing the finding of the jury that the provisions of 
the will set aside by them were procured through 
undue influence, or through any influence for that 
1natter." 
In re George's Esta.te, supra. Deeedent left a number 
of children as heirs. In his will, however, he left his prop-
erty to only t'vo of said children, namely: Elizabeth and 
\V eldow George, and expressly disinherited the others. 
The other children protested admission of the will to pro-
bate on the grounds of testamentary incapacity and un-
due influence. The case was tried to a jury and a verdict 
returned in favor of protestants, upon -vvhich the trial 
court denied probate. On appeal the court reversed with 
directions to adn1it the will to probate and held as a 
Inatter of law that the opponents had not discharged their 
burden of proving testamentary incapacity or undue in-
fluence. This case has been heretofore briefly discussed 
in regard to the question of testa1nentary capacity. The 
facts concerning undue influence are briefly that decedent 
was in failing health, being 84 years of age; was forget-
ful, suffered from pain, was inclined to cry when 1natters 
were not to his liking. 
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Elizabeth had lived in the testator's ho1ne and had 
taken care of her father for a numbeT of years. W eldow· 
had ap·parently taken care of a large portion of his 
father's business interests for a number of years. Wei-
dow was instrumental in getting counsel and witnesses 
present at the time the will was prepared. There was 
some evidence that after the will had been prepared de-
cedent had stated to an acquaintance that he had made 
a mistake in leaving all of his property to Elizabeth and 
'¥ eldow. ·On one occasion a witness testified that he had 
asked decedent whether decedent was going to sell his 
home and farm in Kanos.h. Decedent stated, "Well,. I 
talked of it and I was going to, but W eldow told me not 
to and s.o I daren't." Also, statements from W eldow that 
the "old man" would do anything he wanted him to do. 
There was evidence that W eldow exerted an impelling 
influence on his father, and kept the other children from 
associating with his father. At one time the other chil-
dren had endeavored to have a guardian app·ointed for 
their father and this had made him angry and had also 
angered W eldo:"\v and Elizabeth. The court stated : 
"It is reasonable to believe from the above 
evidence and such of a similar nature that there 
was a desire on the part of W eldow to unduly in-
fluence his father in the distribution of his prop-
erty. This eannot very well be said of Elizabeth, 
however, even though she rnay have benefitted 
as a result of the desires of her brother. But, 
does the evidence actu,ally show that deceased was 
laboring under undue influence at the time of the 
execution of the w·ill? Does it show that he did 
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something he 11.:ould not have done b~tt for the 
inflHence exerted uzJon hi'm by W eldow? It makes 
little difference how hard W eldow labored to ac-
complish the ~tndue influence attributable to his 
desires, if as a ma,tter of fa.ct the father was will-
ing that he and Elizabeth have the property. 
"The bulk of the property covered by the will 
had been deeded to W eldow and Elizabeth from 
three to five years prior to its execution. This may 
indicate influence by those two, but not necessarily 
undue influence. There is no evidence that either 
Weldow or Elizabeth was the source of the idea 
of recognizing those conveyances in the will. That 
originated with the attorneys. Assuming that the 
father was dissatisfied with what he had done by 
those deeds, plenty of time had elapsed for him to 
have changed his mind, and to have concluded that 
the transfers were what he desired after all. On 
January 4th, 1939, other sons and daughters had 
served him with the guardianship papers, an act 
which upset him considerably. It is just as reason-
able to believe that he cut them off on account of 
that incident as it is that the desires of Weldo"\\-r 
were governing his acts at the time, assuming 
that the evidence concerning the acts of W eldo\v 
be treated as sufficient to indicate the exercise at 
that time and by him of undue influence upon de-
ceased. It cannot be said that the burden of proof 
has been substantiated if the evidence: prod,uces 
opposing alternatives of equal weight." 
In re Ford's Esta,te, supra (Facts detailed under 
Point I of this Brief). I-Ield as a matter of law that undue 
influence had not been proven, that where the affection is 
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the inducing cause for the ,vill it is the affection and not 
what p-roduced the affection which is determinative. 
See also In re Bryan's Estate, sup-ra, diseussed else-
where. In re Hansen's Will, supra. 
Many cases from other jurisdictions support wills 
prep~ared by attorneys who are also beneficiaries. The 
following are illustrative: 
In re 111 orey' s Estate, 14 7 Cal. 495, 82 Pac. 57, G2, 
where the court stated: 
''It is claimed that there was a substantial 
conflict in the evidence regarding the issue of un-
due influence. There was evidence that Truesdell, 
one of the residuary legatees \vho \vould receive a 
pHrt of the estate by the provision in his favor, 
drew the will, and had been for a long tiine before 
the attorney for the testator, and that the testator, 
when he made the will, was old, feeble, and suffer-
ing intensely from disease-circumstances which, 
under the rule given in Underhill on Wills, vol. 1, 
p. 209, Civ. Code, S.ec. 2235, Estate of \iVickes, 139 
Cal. 202, 72 Pac. 902, and Estate of McDevitt, 95 
Cal. 33, 30 Pac. 101, would, if taken alone, raise 
the technical implication or p·resmnption that the 
will was p-rocured by the undue influence of Trues-
dell, or would at least require the proponents to 
show what did actually occur at the time of its ·ex-
ecution and prior thereto, so that the presence 
or absence of undue influence by him could be de-
termined. This presumption, it is claimed, is evi-
dence, and creates a conflict, upon 'vhich it \vas 
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necessary to allow the jury to decide. But all 
the other circumstances. surrounding and leading 
up to the execution of the will were fully disclosed 
by the evidence, without conflict, and they showed 
that there was no undue influence. In addition 
to this, there is the positive evidence of the per-
sons present, and of others who could reas.onably 
be supposed to have any knowledge of the case, 
to the effect that such influence was not exerted; 
and the expressed affirmance of the will by the 
testator himself shortly before his death, as al-
ready shown, at a time when the persons charged 
with the exercise of the undue influence did not 
have an opportunity to exercise it, completely re-
move the imputation of undue influence, and show 
that the provisions of the will in favor of the resi-
duary legatees 'vere conceived by the testator him-
self, without influence or suggestion from others. 
This is so satisfactorily proven that a verdict for 
the con tes tan ts, if it had been rendered, should 
have been unhesitatingly set aside by the court." 
In re Phillipi's Estate, 76 Cal. App. 2d 100, 172 P. 2d 
377 (Sept. 16, 1946); In re Anderson's Estate, 142 Okla. 
197, 286 Pac. 17 (Oct. 15, 1929); In re Iiarjoche's Estate, 
193 Okla. 631, 146 P. 2d 130 (Feb. 21, 1944), where it is 
said: 
" '* * * certainly there is no rule of law which 
prevents a party from receiving bequests under, 
or even being the sole beneficiary, in a will made 
by, one to whom he stands in a confidential rela-
tion.' " 
See also: In re Erickson's Estate, supra; In re Nixon's 
Will, 136 N.J. Eq. 242,41 A. 2d 119 (F'eb. 2, 1945); Wu.n.-
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derlich v. Buerger, 287 Ill. 440, 122 N.E. 827; In re Put-
nam's Will, 135 Misc. Rep. 311, 238 N.Y.S. 112, affirmed 
by Court of Ap·p·eals 257 N.Y. 140,177 N.E. 399; Cave v. 
McLean, 66 Ohio App. 196, 32 N.E. 2d 581; In re Guidi's 
Will, 259 Ap·p. Div. 652, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 240 (~fay 31, 1940); 
Oglesby v. Harris (Texas) 130 S.W. 2d 449. 
C10NCLUSION 
We summarize the following clearly established 
prop·ositions of law and fact: 
(1) Medical and lay testimony clearly reveals that 
Gail was mentally competent to know who were the na-
tural objects of her bounty, know her property, and dis-
pose of it understandingly according to a plan. 
(2) Any presumption of undue influence arising 
from the attorney-client relationship·, has no evidentiary 
weight and completely disappeared upon admission of 
evidence concerning execution of the will and codicils. 
(3) Counsel for contestant had the burden of p~rov­
ing undue influence by a perponderance of the evidence. 
( 4) A finding of undue influence cannot be based 
on a presumption or upon mere inference, innuendo or 
susp1c1on. 
( 5) Goodness or evil in the hearts of the benefici-
aries has no materiality. 
(6) No collusion or joint effort on the part of the 
primary beneficiaries was shown to exist. 
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(7) Gail demonstrated over a period of years a 
consistent desire to reward her close friends for their 
1nany kindnesses, not only by expressions of appreciation 
but by gifts and by remembrance in her will. 
(8) Gail ha,d an abiding affection for Macfarla;n.e, 
Kostopu.los and the Bridges, was deeply apprecia,ti.ve of 
their many acts of kindness, a.n.d genuinely desired to 
make them beneficiaries in her will. 
(9) Gail appeared competent and nor1nal to the wit-
nesses to the will and codicils on the three occasions of 
execution. 
(10) The second codicil was actually witnessed by 
a 1nedical doctor and a psychiatrist, who testified that 
Gail talked freely and understandingly about her friends 
and relatives, about her business and property interests, 
and about the contents of the codicil, that they questioned 
her in private about whether she was under "force or 
pressure" from anyone, and that her answer was ''No.'' 
That she appeared calm and businesslike, and stated tha.t 
the codicil expressed her desires. 
(11) The will and codicils were ifexistence five 
years during which time Q-ail was a free agent mingling 
freely with friends and relatives alike. 
(12) When Theo asked Gail in private about her 
will two months before her death, Gail clearly indicated 
that she did not wish Theo to know the contents of her 
will. 
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( 13) Theo was. a very substantial beneficiary. 
(14) Undue influence to vitiate a will must be 
exercised at the very time and in the very act of execu-
tion. 
(15) At the time Macfarlane was last clailned to 
have been exercising undue influence on Gail he was ac-
tually writing a codicil to her will reducing his interest 
in the amount of $24,500. 
(16) There isn't a whisper of evidence that Gail 
W'as ever encouraged, forced:, or otherwise induced to per-
form so much .as a single act against her desires, either 
at the time the will an.d codicils were: ex.ecuted, or a.t any 
other time. 
From the foregoing we respectfully submit that this 
Honorable Court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court and admit the will and codicils of Wilda Gail Swan 
to probate. 
Resp.ectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGs, WALLAcE, RoBERTs & BLACK 
wAYNE L. BLACK 
Counsel for Defendant arnd 
Appellant, Grarnt Macfarlane 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
N. J. CoTRO-MANES 
Counsel for Defendant and 
Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos 
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APPENDIX NO. 1 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do 
1nake, publish and declare this to be Iny Last Will and 
T.estament, hereby revoking a'll former wills by me at any 
time made. 
FIRST: I direct that all my just debts, including 
1ny funeral expenses, expense of 1ny last illness and ex-
penses of the administration of my estate, be paid by my 
executor hereinafter named out of the first moneys com-
ing into his hands and available therefor. 
SECOND: I devise and bequeath to Iny beloved sis-
ter, Theo Swan Hendee, the sum of Five Hundred and 
no j100 Dollars ( $500.00) and my harp. 
THIRD: I devise and bequeath to 1ny loyal friends, 
Jack F. Forsberg and Frances M. F'orsberg, his wife, the 
real property and improvements located thereon at 708-
710-712 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
FOURTH: I devise and bequeath to my friend, 
Grant Macfarlane, the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 326-328-330 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
FIF:TH: I devise and bequeath all the rest, residue 
and remainder of my estate of every kind and descrip-
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tion, both real and personal, wherever located now or 
hereafter owned by me, to by beloved father, Ulysses 
Grant Swan. 
SIXTH: I nominate and ap·point Walker Bank and 
Trust Company .to be the sole executor of this My Last 
Will and Testament. 
SEVENTH: I nominate and appoint my friend, 
Grant Macfarlane, to act as attorney for the above named 
executor in the administration of my estate. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set 1ny 
hand this 2nd day of May, 1947. 
WILDA GAIL SWAN 
Signed by the said testatrix, Wilda Gail Swan, as 
her Last Will and Testament in the pTesence of us, who, 
at her request and in her presence and in the pTesence of 
each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as wit-
nesses. 
pATRICIA L. PIKE 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
D. VIVIAN WEGGELAND 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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APPENDIX NO. 2 
CODICIL 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, of Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby Inake, publish and declare this to he a codicil to 
the Last Wili and Testament heretofore made, signed, 
sealed, published, declared and executed by me and bear-
ing date of May 2, 194 7; that is to say: 
FIRST: Whereas I now desire to make certain 
changes therein and modifications thereof and additions 
thereto; and whereas, the third clause in my said Last 
Will and Testament provided: 
"I devise and bequeath to my loyal friends, 
Jack F. Forsberg and F'rances M. Forsberg, his 
wife, the real property and improvements located 
thereon at 708-710-712 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah." 
I now revoke said third clause of my said Last Witl and 
Testament. 
SECOND: I give and bequeath to Iny friend, Daniel 
Kostopulos, my set of Havilland china and oil painting 
known as "Girl at the Fountain." 
THIRD: In the event my father predeceases me, 
I give, devise and bequeath the real property and iin-
provements located thereon at 708-710-712 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the real property and 
improvements located thereon at 212 South Third East 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to my be1loved sister, Theo 
Swan Hendee. 
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FOURTH: In the event n1y father predeceases n1e, 
I further give, devise and bequeath the real property 
and improvements located thereon at 1335 Perry Avenue, 
and 158 South Third East 'Street, and 234 South Second 
East Street, and 342 East Second South Street, all in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, to my friend, Grant Macfarlane. 
FIF:TH: In the event my father predeceases me, I 
further give, devise and bequeath the real p·roperty and 
improvements located thereon at 56-60-60-lh West Third 
South Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to rny friend, Daniel 
Kostopulos. 
SIX_TH : I hereby modify, amend and extend my 
aforesaid Last Will and Testament in accordance with the 
provisions of this codicil and as herein modified, an1ended 
and extended, I do hereby confirm and republish my Last 
Will and Testament. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 20 day of F'ebruary, 1950. 
WILDA GAIL SwAN 
Signe·d by the said testatrix, Wilda Gail Swan, as a 
codicil to her Last Will and Testament, bearing date of 
~lay 2nd, 1947, in the presence of us who at her request 
and in her presence and in the p-resence of each other 
have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses. 
pATRICIA L. STEW ART 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
IRWIN CLAWSON 
Residing at Salt Lake 
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APPENDIX NO. 3 
CODICIL 
I, WILDA GAIL SWAN, Salt Lake City, Utah, do 
hereby make, publish and declare this to be a Codicil to 
my Last Will and Testament heretofore made, signed, 
sealed, published, declared and executed by me and bear-
ing date of May 2, 1947, with a Codicil bearing date of 
F'ebruary 20, 1950. 
WHEREAS I now desire to make certain changes 
and modifications thereof and additions thereto, that is 
to say: 
FIRST: I devise and bequeath to my beloved sister 
Theo Swan Hendee the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 1335 Perry Avenue in Sa:lt Lake City, 
Utah. 
SECOND: I give and bequeath to my beloved Aunt, 
Bell Matsolf of Redlands, California, the sum of One 
Hundred Dollars. ($100.00). 
THIRD: I give and bequeath and devise to my 
friend, Ada Bridge, the real property and improvements 
located thereon at 230 and 234 South ·second East Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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FOURTH: I give and bequeath and devise to 1ny 
friend, Dan Kostopulos, the rea:l p·roperty and improve-
Inents thereon at 212 South Third East Street in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
FIFTH: I give and bequeath the fire insurance poli-
cies covering my real property to the person or persons 
to whom I have devised said real property. 
SIXTH: It is my wish that 1ny dear friend Dan 
Kostopulos make the funeral arrangen1ents for my last 
rites. 
S.EVENTH: All of the rest, residue and remainder 
of my property, real, person and mixed not otherwise 
disposed of in my Last Will and Testament and the Codi-
cil thereto, I give, devise and bequeath to my helorved 
sister Theo Swan Hendee. 
EIGHTH: In the event that ·my sister Theo Swan 
Hendee predeceases me, then I give, devise· and bequeath 
the property heretofore devised to Theo Swan Gendec 
and all the rest, residue and remainder of my property 
not heretofore devised, real, personal and mixed, to my 
friends Dan Kostopulos and Grant Macfarlane, share 
and share alike. 
NINTH: I hereby ratify and confirm my said Last 
Will and Testament and Codicil in all other respects. 
IN WITNESS WHERE·OF, I have hereunto set my 
hand this 23 day of April, 1951. 
\VILDA GAIL SWAN 
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Signed by the said testator, Wi'lda Gail Swan, as a 
Codicil to her Last Will and Testan1ent in the presence 
of us, who at her request and in her presence and in the 
presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our 
names as witnesses. 
ADOLPH M. NEILSEN, M.D. 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
RoY A. DARKE, M.D. 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Property 
Date Acquired 
.· 
Will of . 
May 2,1947 
Jack Forsberg 
Died. Nov. 29 
1948 
Codicil of 
Feb.20,1950 
(If Gail Dies 
First) 
If Father 
Dies First 
Father Died 
June30, 195'0 
Codicil of 
.Apri123, 1951 
326 South 
State St. 
1911 
$55,250 
Grant 
Macfarlane 
Grant 
Macfarlane 
Grant 
Macfarlane 
Grant 
Macfarlane 
158 South 
3rd East St. 
1944 
$29,950 
,Father 
Father 
Grant 
Macfarlane 
iJ 
u; 
' .. ::.!'; J 
". ~1.'·..:1 
Grant · ::.); ~;. Grant Macfarlarl~ ·:~:;~~ . ~aefarlane 
·.. • . ';;:,·:··:~ 
' .· . ···•·:'• Grant Grant ':'::.;;;;,~Ada 
Macfarlane Macfarlane-: :i:r/ i 13ridge 
· , :•c'i ;,l.• 
) ' 
' 
1335 Perry 
Avenue 
1931 
$12,500 
Father 
Father · 
Grant 
Macfarlane · 
' 
.Theo 
Hendee 
APPENDIX NO. ·4 
Oakland 
Hotel 
1931 
$82,,500 
Father 
Father 
Dan 
Kostopulos 
Dan 
· Kostopulos 
I . ' 
·.· 
212 South · 
3rd East 
1944 
$8,000 
Father 
Father 
T;heo 
Hendee 
Dan 
Kostopulos 
:·Swan 
Apattments . 
1932' 
$55,000 
Jack 
Forsberg 
Father 
Theo 
Hendee 
Theo 
Hendee 
Harp 
$200 
'l~heo 
I endee 
"~heo 
1~endee · 
'l~heO 
I endee 
- 'Iheo 
1~endee 
$500.00 
Theo 
Hendee 
Theo 
Hendee 
Theo 
Hendee 
Theo 
.Hendee 
$40.00 
China 
Painting 
$75.00 
Dan 
Kostopulos 
Dan 
Kostopulos 
Dan 
Kostopulos 
,·,· ·, 
$100.00 .. 
Aunt 
Bell 
Residual 
Legatee 
.Father 
' 
· Father 
Theo 
Hendee 
Theo 
Hendee 
EXHIBIT "D-18'' . 
.~ 
i 
'l 
'I 
·.\ 
'i 
' • I 
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REC·EIVE·D ---------------- copies of the within Brief of 
Ap~pellants this---------------- day of January, 19·55. 
Counsel for Plai·ntiff arnd' Respondent 
.. 
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